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There are many ways parents can improve their offspring’s outcomes. For 
example, they can invest in offspring’s education or health. They can provide better 
social connections to obtain job information or personal references. In addition, they 
can exert political influence to obtain better labor market outcomes for their offspring.  
Understanding exactly how parents improve their offspring’s outcomes is very 
important for the formation of political perspectives and policy designs. However, it is 
very difficult to disentangle the factors, as parents of high socioeconomic status do 
many things to help their children succeed. This dissertation presents three quasi-
experimental studies to understand the causal mechanisms of parents’ influence on 
children’s outcomes in the context of China and United States.  
Chapter two examines the implementation of court-ordered racial desegregation of 
schools and finds that school desegregation increases biracial births. This provides the 
first evidence of how an education policy that affects racial integration also has 
demographic implications and an intergenerational impact on social and economic 
opportunities. 
Chapter three examines the effect of school desegregation on infant health. This 
chapter adopts the same empirical strategy and data as chapter three. I extend the paper 
by examining the effect of school desegregation on infant health. I find that for black 
mothers, school desegregation improves infant health, as measured by preterm birth. It 
also increases maternal education and fertility age. These may be important 
pathways to improve infant health. Chapter two and chapter three add to the growing 
literature on the impact of school desegregation beyond academic achievement.  
Chapter five examines the effect of fathers’ political influence on offspring’s labor 
market outcomes in China. It presents a difference-in-difference approach that exploits 
the variation of political influence in three dimensions: parent bureaucrat occupation, 
retirement status instrumented by retirement policy, and offspring gender. Using cross-
section data from China Household Income Survey, it finds that the retirement of a 
bureaucrat with political influence translates into a decrease in offspring’s income of 13 
percent. 
Chapter six provides a summary and conclusions and discusses future research 
directions.   
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Chapter One - Introduction 
 
Intergenerational persistence refers to the association between the socio-economic 
outcomes of parents and their children. High intergenerational persistence means that 
the offspring of a rich family are more likely to stay rich, and the offspring of a poor 
family are more likely to stay poor. Becker and Tomes (1979) formalize the theory of 
inequality and intergenerational mobility. They assume each family maximizes a utility 
function spanning several generations. Utility depends on the consumption of parents 
and on the quantity and quality of their children. The income of the children is raised 
when they receive more human and nonhuman capital from their parents. For example, 
genetically, parents can endow children with race, health, and ability. Parents can 
provide investment in children’s education and health. Further, parents can provide 
capital such as family reputation and connections, which can have a shaping role on 
knowledge, skills, and goals developed and obtained later in life.  
Solon (1999) suggests that around 40% of the variance in the permanent 
component of the logarithm of earnings is generated by variations in the family and 
community background factors shared by siblings. Whether this variation is considered 
large or small depends on one’s beliefs about why intergenerational influences on 
earnings are as strong as they are. Do offspring of the rich become rich because parents 
invest in education and health, or do they become rich because their parents provide 
useful social connections to obtain job information and internal references? 
Understanding the causal mechanism is very important in forming political 
attitudes. Survey data show that people who think that “getting ahead and succeeding in 
life “depends on “hard work” or “willingness to take risks” tend to oppose 
redistributive programs (Bowles & Gintis, 2002). However, people who think success 
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in life has largely depended on parental investment favor redistribution programs to 
compensate for differences in family abilities to make these investments. Isolating the 
causal mechanism is also important for policy design. For example, if parents are well 
educated enabling them to raise healthier babies, there is a social role for government 
investment in education.  Likewise, if employers favor less qualified applicants who 
have parental connections, government needs to intervene with creative ways to reduce 
information asymmetry or reduce nepotism.  
However, it is very difficult to disentangle the factors that lead to success, as 
parents of high socioeconomic status do many things to help their children succeed. An 
ideal experiment would be to change only one parental characteristic at a time, and 
examine its impact on children. For example, we can randomly select young women to 
have an additional year of education, and examine its effect on their offspring. Social 
experiments like these are impossible to engineer, as it is impossible to randomly 
assign one parental characteristic to a child. When we can’t perform a randomized 
experiment, we need to find some other way to control for inherent differences between 
families. Simple methods such as regressions may not be sufficient because it cannot 
control for unobservable differences.   
Therefore, my dissertation adopts a quasi-experimental design that attempts to 
isolate parental characteristics and examine their impact on the children. Quasi-
experiment is not a randomized experiment. Instead, it intends to mimic an experiment 
and relies on shocks that randomly change only one characteristics of the parent (see 
Angrist and Pischke 2009 for examples of quasi-experiments). Thus, it relies on the 
assumption that the change is truly random and not correlated with changes in other 
parental characteristics. I believe my research can add a general contribution to the 
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literature of understanding of causal mechanism of intergenerational persistence in the 
context of China and United States.  
Chapters two and three examine parental education and birth outcome. In chapter 
three, I examine school desegregation and subsequent biracial births in the population. 
The proportion of black and white biracial births in the United States is an important 
indicator of racial relationship. Its level remains low due to factors such as residential 
and school segregation, racial inequality, and social prejudice which result in few inter-
racial interactions in daily life. Racially integrated schools increase inter-racial social 
contacts and the likelihood of establishing inter-racial friendships. This chapter 
examines how the implementation of court-ordered school desegregation affects the 
proportion of biracial births. Prior to 1954, public schools were explicitly and 
completely separated by race in the Southern and Border states1. Outside the South, 
migration, housing patterns, and actions by school leaders contributed to similar racial 
isolation in the schools. Black schools received fewer resources and taught by almost 
exclusively black teachers (Guryan, 2002; Reber, 2005).  There is a general consensus 
that segregation of black is a leading cause of racial and ethnic differences on many 
economic, social, and health related outcomes (Almond, Chay, and Greestone 2007; 
Borjas 2010; Case and Katz 1991; Kain 1968; Culter and Glaeser 1997; Hanushek et al. 
2002; Massey and Denton 1993; Collins and Williams, 1999). The Supreme Court’s 
1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education declared segregated schools to be 
“inherently unequal.”2 It was the intent of these court orders to provide equal 
educational resources to blacks and eradicate segregation on the basis of race. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Border states refer to Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.  
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
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I exploit county, as well as state-specific cohort, variation, taking advantage of the 
difference in plausibly exogenous implementation timing across counties, with 
treatment affecting only cohorts of children in school-age at the time of 
implementation. Using birth certificate data, I find that school desegregation increases 
biracial births. It also increases years of education at the time of birth, and age of first-
birth among black mothers. In addition, school desegregation is associated with an 
increase in biracial births and years of education at birth among white mothers. While 
there have been studies examining the effects of education and housing policy on 
physical distance, there has not been any causal study that examines the effect of policy 
on interracial behaviors. Chapter two provides the first evidence of how an educational 
policy affects racial composition and demography, which can lead to extended 
intergenerational impacts on social and economic opportunities.  
Chapter three examines the effect of school desegregation on infant health. This 
chapter adopts the same empirical strategy and data as chapter three. I extend chapter 
three by examining the effect of school desegregation on infant health. I find that for 
black mothers, school desegregation improves infant health, as measured by preterm 
birth. It also increases maternal education, maternal age, and paternal age. These may 
be important pathways to improved infant health. This paper contributes to research on 
mother’s education and infant health. Recent quasi-experimental research largely 
focused on children who are at the risk of dropping out of school (McCrary and Royer 
2010; Oreopoulos et al. 2003; Sandra et al. 2005) or white children only  (Currie and 
Moretti 2003). I contribute to this line of literature by examining black females who are 
affected by school desegregation, a much larger group by population size.  
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Chapter four examines the effect of fathers’ political influence on offspring’s labor 
market outcomes in China. Political influence refers to the ability to convert political 
power into economic benefits. The empirical strategy identifies the dissolution of 
political influence by exploiting an age-based mandatory retirement rule in China. I 
present a difference-in-difference approach that exploits the variation of political 
influence in three dimensions: bureaucratic status with political influence, retirement 
status instrumented by retirement policy, and offspring gender.  
In democratic countries, political power can be translated into economic 
advantages because bureaucrats can affect the allocation of resources through the 
design and implementation of regulation (Stigler, 1971). In return, bureaucrats can 
receive votes or resources by providing firms with regulatory favors such as subsidies 
or tax benefits. In transitional economies like China, bureaucrats have almost absolute 
control over resources at the outset of a transition to the marketplace, since “virtually 
all capital, real estate, and natural resources are initially under public ownership” 
(Walder 2003, pg 901). Because of this lingering legacy of a command economy, 
politicians can garner economic benefits through their ability to acquire or sell state 
property through privatization. Thus, their offspring can also reap economic benefits 
directly through establishing their own companies or making strategic investments. 
In this dissertation, bureaucrat status is defined as those who are directors or vice 
directors of a government or pseudo-government organizations, such as state- owned 
enterprises (SOE) or public organizations. Using cross-sectional data from the China 
Household   Income Survey, I find that the retirement of a bureaucrat translates into a 
decrease in offspring’s income of 13 percent. This chapter adds to a small but growing 
set of literature on intergenerational correlations of political connection. Wang (2013) 
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finds that the death of a father-in-law reduces offspring's wage by 7% using individual 
fixed effect. She suggests that the income decline is due to nepotism, but did not focus 
on political influence in particular and cannot isolate nepotism from social connection. 
I contribute to this line of literature by isolating political influence from other 
bureaucratic parental characteristics.  
The rest of the dissertation is organized as following. Chapter two to chapter five 
presents three papers respectively. Chapter sixth provides a conclusion, discusses 
caveats, and presents future research directions.  
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Chapter Two - How I Met Your Mother: Intergenerational Effect of School 
Desegregation 
 
2.1 Introduction  
	  
Among all first-time births in the United States, the proportion of biracial births 
between black and white individuals increased from 0.5% in 1970 to 2.5% in 2000 
(Figure 1). However, this figure is relatively low: If people mated randomly across 
races, black/white biracial births would account for more than 9% of all births. (Blacks 
and Whites accounts for 14% and 62% of the total population. If they mate randomly, 
black-mother-white-father birth would account for 4.5% of the total births; black-
father-white-mother would also account for 4.5% of the total births.) 
As children are the most important “products” of the family (Browning, Chiappori, 
and Weiss, Pg 44), the share of biracial children is an important indicator of race 
relations. What is more, an increase in the share of biracial children may contribute to 
improvements in race relations and equity between racial groups. Having biracial 
children increases interracial social contact, as raising children usually requires 
continuous family collaboration. Social contact is a necessary condition for the 
reduction of discrimination (Allport, 1954), academic success based on peer effects,3 
and labor market success based on information and social connections.4 Further, the 
identity of biracial children, representing the union of black and white parents, changes 
the country’s demography and contributes to its racial and ethnic diversity. 
The low level of black and white biracial births may be due to factors such as 
strong patterns of residential and school segregation, America’s long history of racial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 See Sacerdote (2011) for a review.  
4 See Ioannides and Loury (2004) for a review. 	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inequality in the economic sphere, the general pattern of assortative mating by 
education, and high degrees of social prejudice (Kalmijn, 1993). While there have been 
studies examining the effects of education and housing policy on physical distance, 
there has not been any causal study that examines the effect of policy on interracial 
behaviors.  
This chapter examines the causal effect of an important historical and policy-
amenable obstacle—segregated schools. Prior to 1954, public schools were explicitly 
and completely separated by race in the Southern and Border states5. Outside the South, 
migration, housing patterns, and actions by school leaders contributed to similar racial 
isolation in the schools. Black schools received fewer resources and taught by almost 
exclusively black teachers (Guryan, 2002; Reber, 2005).  There is a general consensus 
that segregation of black is a leading cause of racial and ethnic differences on many 
economic, social, and health related outcomes (Almond, Chay, and Greestone 2003; 
Borjas 1995; Case and Katz 1991; Kain 1968; Cutler and Glaeser 1997; Hanushek 
Kain, and Rivkin 2009; Massey and Denton 1993; Collins and Williams, 1999). The 
Supreme Court’s 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Education declared segregated 
schools to be “inherently unequal.”6 It was the intent of these court orders to provide 
equal educational resources to blacks and eradicate segregation on the basis of race. 
Over the next 30 years, school districts desegregated under court orders7. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Border states refer to Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.  
 
6 347 U.S. 483 (1954) 
 
7 To provide context, I draw from the existing widely documented knowledge about the timeline of 
school desegregation. The Brown decision by itself was not sufficient to integrate the school districts. 
Only a few school districts voluntarily desegregated between 1950s and early 1960s. Desegregation did 
not begin in earnest until the mid-1960s. The enactment of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA) 
and Title I funds of the 1965 Elementary & Secondary Education act (ESEA) prohibited federal aid to 
segregated schools and allowed the Justice Department to join suits against school districts that were in 
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implementation of school desegregation improved education outcomes (Guryan, 2004; 
Reber, 2010; Johnson, 2011; Bergman, 2015), improved health and labor market 
outcomes (Ashenfelter, Collins, and Yoon, 2006; Johnson, 2011), and reduced local 
crime rates (Weiner, Lutz and Ludwig, 2009; Johnson, 2011). While desegregation 
policy has to some extent reduced the gaps between black and white racial groups in 
the economic and social spheres in the 1980s and 1990s8, the extent to which racial 
attitudes have changed is unclear. The effect of school desegregation on racial 
integration remains an open question.  
My study approaches these questions using individual-level birth certificate 
information. Birth certificates provide basic information on parental characteristics and 
infant information. I exploit county, as well as cohort, variation, taking advantage of 
the difference in plausibly exogenous implementation timing across counties, with 
treatment affecting only cohorts of children in school-age at the time of 
implementation. More specifically, I compare the fertility outcomes from age 15 to 40 
for women who were 18 or older at the time of desegregation and, therefore, were not 
exposed to desegregated K-12 schools with those for women who were younger than 
18 at the time of desegregation and, therefore, were exposed to desegregated schools. I 
use cohort fixed effect to allow for secular changes over cohorts. In addition, I use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
violation of the Brown vs. Board order to integrate. The 1973 Keyes vs. Denver School district decision 
(413 U.S. 189) rules that court-ordered litigation applied to areas which had not practiced de jure 
segregation. This marked the beginning of large-scale desegregation efforts in both the North and the 
South (Johnson, 2009).  
8 It is important to note that blacks are still found in segregated schools in most areas of the country.  
Because of the persistence in housing segregation, schools have become more segregated again in the 
1990s and 2000s after they are phased out from the court orders. The courts appear to be abandoning 
their efforts to force school districts to integrate. Many have argued that a rise in school segregation has 
led to an increase in racial gaps again (Lutz, 2011; Reardon et al., 2011; Billings, Deming, and Rockoff 
et al., 2012; Wells et al., 2008).  
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county fixed effect so that it is not necessary that the timing of policy change be 
unrelated to county characteristics.   
 In addition, I provide several pieces of evidence to rule out potential alternative 
hypotheses. First, I follow an event-study approach and find that there is a stable and 
low level of biracial births for women who were not exposed to school desegregation. 
The level of biracial births increases for women who are exposed to more years of 
school desegregation. Second, I use division-, region-, or state-specific cohort fixed 
effect and find that my results are robust to these specifications. Third, I conduct a 
falsification test and find that, while the implementation of school desegregation in the 
mother's seventeenth year or younger affects her birth outcomes from age 15 to 40, 
implementations in her eighteen to twenty-first year do not. Lastly, my results are 
robust to state-specific time trends. 
I find robust evidence that school desegregation induces more biracial births 
among black mothers. Longer length of exposure to desegregated schools increases 
biracial births. I also find that school desegregation improves infant health among black 
mothers. In addition, it increases parental education and decreases the probability of 
teenage pregnancy. These are possible mechanisms to an increase in biracial births and 
an improvement of infant health.    
I find that, among white mothers, school desegregation is positively associated 
with biracial births and maternal education. However, the effect of school 
desegregation on infant health is mixed. These findings may not be causal because of 
whites' potential endogenous migration. 9. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 White families with higher socioeconomic status (SES) have migrated to avoid school desegregation. 
As only families who are friendly to blacks or have lower SES remained in the county, this may cause an 
upward bias in results on biracial births. However, it may because a downward bias in results on 
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This study provides the first evidence on how an education policy can affect racial 
composition and demography, which can lead to an extended intergenerational impact 
on social and economic opportunities. It also provides a new behavioral measure of 
social integration. Lastly, it contributes to literature on mothers’ education and 
pregnancy outcomes by finding that a potential increase in school quality, measured by 
change in the composition of peer, delays fertility age for black mothers.  
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review. 
Section 3 discusses the context for the current study and its empirical strategy. Section 
4 discusses the mechanisms by which school desegregation could lead to an increase in 
biracial births. Section 5 describes the study’s method, including the dataset used, 
descriptive statistics for the sample, and the regression specification used in the 
analysis. Section 6 discusses the results and their implications for policy.  
2.1 Literature Review 
	  
Commonly used measures of racial integration, such as school, residential, or 
occupational segregation indices (e.g., Clotfelter, 2004; Massey and Denton, 1988; 
Tomaskovic-Devey et al., 2006) provide insights on social environments and 
opportunities for interracial interactions. However, they cannot gauge the extent of 
interpersonal contact (Berry, 2006). When they are measured at the team or classroom 
level, these measures are often limited to a short-term period of observation in formal 
settings, and do not provide a trend analysis on a national level. Survey studies 
generally describe racial attitudes but lack a behavioral component (Kalmijn, 1993). 
Thus, it is possible that shifts in racial attitudes measured by surveys merely reflect a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
mothers’ education. This will be discussed more carefully in the method section.   
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modern commitment to the social belief that people should not be judged by their skin 
color, without an actual decrease in the social distance between races (Feagin, 1991; 
Fisher and Hartmann, 1995). In addition, in survey studies, more educated individuals, 
who are likely to be more aware of the “politically correct” answers, are more likely to 
provide answers with a larger reporting bias (eg. Maccoby and Maccoby 1954).  
Previous research has measured racial integration by examining interracial 
marriage. For example, researchers have sought to explain the occurrence of black–
white marriages by applying social exchange theory (Merton, 1941; Blau, 1964; 
Kalmijn, 1993), search model and interaction model (Adachi, 2003), and the marriage 
market model (Becker, 1973; Fryer, 2007). Kalmijn (1993) and Fryer (2007) point to 
the decline in racial gaps by socioeconomic status, the end of anti-miscegenation laws, 
the decline in white prejudice against blacks, the decline in residential segregation 
during the 1970s and 1980s, the decline in occupational distribution differences, and 
the increase of military enlistment by black Americans as major factors that contribute 
to the increase of marriages between black and white individuals.10 However, these 
studies generally provide analysis of trends using marriage license data, census data, or 
survey data. In addition, examining interracial marriage overlooks intimate interracial 
relationship outside of marriage. As calculated using birth certificate data, sixty-eight 
percent of births by black women occur outside of marriage, as do 26% of births by 
white women. This reflects a new trend in individual behavior and household formation. 
Thus, biracial births serves as another useful indicator of interracial coupling; 
regardless of parental relationships and commitment levels, biracial births represent a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 On the decline in racial gaps, see Firebaugh and Davis (1988); Schuman et al. (1985). On the decline 
in residential segregation, see Farley (1991); Massey and Denton (1987). On the decline in occupational 
distribution differences, see Farley and Allen (1987). On military service, see Romano (2003).  
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stable outcome because the child will always represent the union of black and white 
parents. It is also an outcome of legal importance, as the father is legally obligated to 
provide for the child financially until the child turns 18 in many states11. 
This paper contributes to the literature on mothers’ education and pregnancy 
decisions (McCrary and Royer, 2011; Currie and Moretti, 2003; Liu et al., 2012; 
Bifulco et. al., 2015). My results are consistent with findings from previous literature 
suggesting that additional schooling delays fertility age. My results are similar to those 
of Liu et al. (2012), who compare teen pregnancy in school districts that desegregated 
in 1970 and those that desegregated in 1980, and find that school desegregation 
decreases black women’s rates of teenage pregnancy. I refine their empirical strategy 
by exploiting variation in the year in which school desegregation takes place. However, 
my results are different from those of Bifulco et al. (2015), who find that school 
desegregation increases black women’s likelihood of giving birth as teenagers. This is 
probably due to a difference in empirical strategy: Bifulco et al. (2015) compare 
teenage pregnancy before and after the implementation of school desegregation within 
a county, controlling for birth year. However, they fail to control for cohort fixed 
effects. Hence, their result may be reflecting cohort differences.12  
Lastly, the current paper adds to an understanding of the effects of school 
desegregation beyond educational achievement (Bifulco et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2012; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 There is a high default rate in child support, especially for children born out of wedlock.  The dearth of 
financial support is documented in the March Current population Survey: over 1989-2010, only 19% of 
never-married mothers report receiving any child support income (Rossin-Slater 2013). Nevertheless, 
having a child together increases the probability of interracial contact.  
 
12 In addition, the data are unbalanced in the sense that at the beginning of the years with data availability 
(1968), I can only observe people in earlier cohorts who give birth at an older age. At the end of the 
years with data availability (1988), I can only observe people in later cohorts who give birth at a young 
age. Hence, without controlling for cohorts, I am more likely to observe later cohorts giving birth at a 
younger age. 
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Guryan, 2004; Reber, 2010; Johnson, 2011; Lutz, 2011; Ludwig et al., 2012; Johnson, 
2011; Billings et al., 2013; Bergman, 2015). It is consistent with previous literature in 
that it finds school desegregation increases education among black students (Guryan, 
2004; Reber, 2010; Johnson, 2011; Bergman, 2015). Unlike previous research that did 
not find any effect of desegregation on whites’ outcomes (Guryan, 2004; Johnson, 
2011), this paper provides evidence that exposure to desegregation is associated with 
more biracial births and an increase in education at the time of birth among all white 
mothers.  
2.2 Background  
	  
2.2.1 Desegregation Policy and Quasi-experiment  
	  
In 1954, the Supreme Court declared that school districts should desegregate “with 
all deliberate speed” (Brown II; 349 U.S. 294, 1955). However, the exact practices13 
and timing of desegregation were not specified and were left for the lower federal 
courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. Most of the nation’s largest districts had to be 
ordered to desegregate as a result of individual cases filed in the local federal court by 
private civil rights groups. As a result, the timing of desegregation varied across school 
districts (Guryan, 2004).  
National or local civil rights groups aiming to bring about social changes 
through the court usually bring legal challenges to court, one at a time. Civil rights 
groups filed for court cases following the “favorable legal precedents” rule, meaning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 A desegregation plan can be classified as voluntary or involuntary. This distinction refers to whether 
students are permitted to choose the school they will attend. The voluntary plans include freedom of 
choice, magnets, and other voluntary transfers. Involuntary plans include neighborhood attendance zones, 
rezoning, and pairing and clustering. School districts have many options to choose from in designing a 
plan that meets their specific needs. However, the plan must also be acceptable to the court (Welch and 
Light 1987). 
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that they first filed for court in counties with larger probability of success (Guryan 
2004). The probability of success is important for school desegregation because earlier 
successful cases can have positive spill-over effects on later cases.  This practice is 
recorded by the legal history of desegregation documents, the legal arm of the NAACP 
(Legal Defense and Educational Fund)..."followed a strategic approach that rejected 
simple accumulation of big cases, in favor of incremental victories that built a 
favorable legal climate..." (Council for Public Interest Law, 1976, p. 37).  
 The role of precedent suggests that any strategy to identify the effect of 
desegregation on births should focus on controlling for district characteristics that made 
legal victory more likely and thus led some districts to be desegregated earlier than 
others. Across states, the probability of success can be determined by potentially 
factors that are related to the birth outcomes. However, within a state, while the 
probability of success may continue to play a role in determining the implementation 
timing, the difference in timing can also be attributed to factors such as the 
characteristics of district courts, the filing process of the local civil rights groups, the 
processing time of the court, and the enactment time of school district (Johnson, 2011). 
These differences are arguably more exogenous because it involves more diverse 
players. This timing differences across count within a state provide the first level of 
difference that I can exploit in my empirical strategy.  
In addition, since school desegregation took place in the elementary school to 
high school level, it only affects students who were at school-age at the time of 
desegregation implementation. Hence, within a county, the treatment group refers to 
the women who are under the age of 18 at the time of school desegregation and thus are 
still at elementary to high school. The control group refers to women who are over age 
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18 at the time of school desegregation and thus have already left high school. I compare 
the fertility outcomes from age 15 to age 40 of the treatment group with those of the 
control group.   
     Thus, the source of variation comes from cohort and county level. To illustrate this 
using a simple difference-in-difference, if school desegregation took place in 1969 in 
Lee County, Florida, the treatment group is cohort of 1952 because this group of 
women were at age 17 at the time of school desegregation. The control group is cohort 
of 1950 because this group of women were at age 19 at the time of school 
desegregation. For example, if Dade County, Florida desegregated in 1960, both cohort 
of 1952 and cohort of 1950 are the control group because these two groups of women 
were already 19 and 21 at the time of school desegregation. Thus, to estimate the effect 
of school desegregation on biracial births, I can compare the difference in fertility 
outcomes between cohort of 1952 with 1950 in Lee County with the difference in 
fertility outcomes between cohort of 1952 with 1950 in Dade County. As I have 
multiple counties and multiple cohorts, I present a multiple difference-in-difference 
approach across cohorts and counties.  In the empirical strategy, I use cohort fixed 
effect and county fixed effect. Cohort fixed effect allow for secular changes in birth 
outcomes over cohorts. For example, if later cohorts were on average more progressive 
than the earlier cohorts, the cohort fixed effect can absorb state-level cohort 
differences. County fixed effects allow for unobserved characteristics of the counties to 
differ as long as: (a) these characteristics are fixed over time during the period of study; 
(b) timing of school desegregation is not correlated with changes in these 
characteristics; or (c) these characteristics are not related to the birth outcomes.    
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     To poise a threat to the empirical strategy, there must be cohort-varying 
characteristics that are driving the changes in both the timing of school desegregation 
and birth outcomes. Since earlier cohorts (age 18-22 years old at the time of school 
desegregation) are still within fertility age the time of possible county-specific changes 
that led to school desegregation, they would also be affected in the same county. Thus, 
I can directly examine whether the birth outcomes of these earlier cohorts are also 
affected using graphical evidence and falsification test.   More specifically, I examine 
the existence of pre-trend before school desegregation graphically. Having no pre-trend 
means that earlier cohorts have similar rates of biracial births. If there is no pre-trend, it 
would provide evidence to rule out that there are other underlying county-specific 
trends that are driving the changes in biracial births. In addition, I conduct a 
falsification test and examine the effect of policy for individuals who are 18 to 22 at the 
time of school desegregation. If school desegregation only affects the birth outcomes 
from 15-40 years old for individuals who are at the age younger than 18 at the time of 
school desegregation, but does not affect those of individuals who are 18 to 22 at the 
time of school desegregation, it would provide another evidence ruling out alternative 
hypotheses that changing characteristics of the county induce the implementation of 
policy and changes in the outcome of our interests.   I also examine the effect of school 
desegregation on the probability of having a biracial or multiracial child by black and 
non-white parents (eg. black and asian). The school desegregation may not affect the 
exposure of Asian students to black students, because Asian students may be grouped 
into black schools in some counties. Finding that school desegregation does not affect 
black and non-white biracial birth would serve as an additional evidence to eliminate 
the story of county-specific trend changes.    
	   	   	   	   	  
 18 
     For additional robustness test, I replace cohort fixed effect with division-, region-, 
or state-specific cohort fixed effect. With state-specific cohort fixed effect, I am only 
exploiting variation in school desegregation timing within a state. On average, i my 
sample, there are 3 counties per state and on average, and the time difference between 
the earliest desegregated county and the latest desegregated county is five years.  State-
specific fixed cohort effects allow for state-specific secular changes in birth outcomes 
over cohorts. Lastly, for robustness tests, I use state-specific time trends, capturing 
time-varying changes for the year of mother's birth within a state.   
     While I can never completely rule out the possibility of county-varying trends, I 
cannot think of any other policy took place at the same time of school desegregation 
and also affected cohorts that were in school age at the same time of school 
desegregation.  
2.2.2 White Flight  
	  
Reber (2005) found that school desegregation led white families to leave the public 
school districts that desegregation took place. Wells (2008) also found a similar 
pattern. To avoid desegregated public schools, some white parents enrolled their 
children in private schools; others changed neighborhoods and moved to suburb 
districts to continue to attend public schools. Further, this pattern persisted throughout 
the time of school desegregation and played a larger role in the Northern states, where 
the geographic size of school district boundary is smaller and hence it is easier for 
parents to move across school districts (Wells 2008). This pattern could cause 
identification problems for examining the effect of school desegregation on whites. If 
only white women who are friendly toward blacks stay in the public school districts, it 
would cause an upward bias in the estimation on biracial births. If only white women 
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who were of low socioeconomic status remained the desegregated public school 
districts, it would cause a downward bias in the estimation of mother’s education. 
Guryan (2004) argues that many of the white migrants may have fled to suburban areas 
in the same county. Examining the effect of school desegregation at the county level 
mitigates this problem if whites are moving into private schools or suburban districts 
within the same county. Further, I restrict the sample of analysis to mothers who were 
born and gave birth in the same state. While these data restrictions partially reduce the 
concern about endogenous migration, they would not solve the problem if “white 
“flight” brought them to suburbs in another county in the same state where they were 
born. Thus, this limits my interpretation of outcomes for white mothers to correlative 
information. 
There is no evidence that black individuals migrated systematically in reaction to 
school desegregation. Guryan’s (2004) estimates show no indication that desegregation 
plans led to a decrease in the population of high-school-aged blacks in districts.  
2.2.3 Potential Mechanisms for Increased Biracial Birth Rates  
	  
Change in School Quality 
     School desegregation may change the education experience for black students in 
three ways. It has increased school funding for students. During the 1950s, there was 
limited state support for K-12 education in the majority of states. Education is heavily 
reliant on local property tax. The congressional enactment of Elementary and 
Secondary Education Act increased the amount of federal aid to education: from a few 
million to more than one billion dollars a year (Cascio et al., 2010). In addition, it 
moved black students to better schools attended previously by white students only 
(Guryan 2011; Reber 2005; Reber 2010; Rossell and Armor 1996; Welch and Light 
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1987; Wells 2008). Though total support for the schools that were traditionally white 
may decline, integration may still lead to a change in the average quality of schools to 
which black students attended.   
      In addition, desegregation increased blacks' exposure to whites in schools. There is 
strong evidence that implementation of desegregation plans decreased the degree of 
segregation of public school districts (Guryan 2011; Reber 2005; Reber 2010; Rossell 
and Armor 1996; Welch and Light 1987). Guryan (2001) shows that black students 
experienced a sharp increase in exposure to white students, on the order of 5 percentage 
points, in the initial year of the desegregation plan. This was followed by additional 
integration in the second year of school desegregation. There is a growing body of 
research that finding the importance of racial and ethnic school composition on student 
achievement. White students are typically assumed to have positive peer effects, in part 
because whites tended to have higher socioeconomic status and better scores on 
achievement tests14 (Coleman et al. 1966).   Students with higher socioeconomic status 
or better score can provide positive peer effect through face-to-face interactions, such 
as competition, emulation, or identification associated with students’ primary reference 
group. In addition, even after controlling for child- and school-level demographic 
characteristics, racial composition affects students’ achievement for two reasons 
(Rumberger and Willms 1992; Ready and Silander 2011).  First, students in segregated 
schools may receive poorer education because schools serving predominantly 
minorities or low socioeconomic groups have poorer resources15 and teachers16. Second, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See Sacerdote (2011) for literature review on how peer’s academic achievement matters.   
  
15 Recent studies have shown consistently that a variety of school factors affect student achievement after 
controlling for student background (e.g., Lee and Bryk 1989; Willms 1986). Segregated schools have 
lower public funding because school relies on local pubic finance.  
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student composition may affect achievement through contextual peer effects, which can 
affect the academic, social, and disciplinary climate in the school; parental involvement 
and expectations; and teachers’ expectations (Ready and Silander 2011; Willms and 
Raudenbush 1989).  
     Lastly, school desegregation may change the education commitment of black 
families because they want to reap the benefits of school integration. Students may 
work harder because they feel enfranchised about the court success. 
    On the other hand, there are some concerns regarding the negative effect of school 
desegregation on black students. First, some black schools are closed down because 
white students are unwilling to be bussed to traditionally black schools. In traditionally 
white schools or integrated schools, there is an emphasis on retaining the white 
students. Hence, whites are given preferential treatment in terms of cultural practice 
and advanced classes. This may lead to a decrease in morale for black students. In 
addition, black students also bear the burden of being bussed to schools that are further 
away from their neighborhood (Wells, 2006). Despite these concerns, it is generally 
considered that school desegregation improved the education quality for black students.   
There are three channels through which school desegregation may have led to 
increases in biracial births: an increase of interaction, an increase of social status 
among blacks, and a decrease of racial discrimination.  
Increase of Social Interaction  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 There is a large literature showing teachers matter for academic achievement and long-run life 
outcomes (e.g. Chetty, Friedman, and Rockoff 2011). The teachers and principals are less qualified in 
schools with high poverty rates as compared to schools wit lower rates of poverty rates (Clotfelter, Ladd, 
Vigdor 2006).  
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First, school integration may increase the proportion of biracial births by 
increasing opportunities for children and teenagers to interact with members of other 
races. Based on search models and interaction models, interracial marriages or births 
arise because of interactions with members of other racial groups (Adachi, 2003). 
Therefore, increasing the number of members of another race within a given setting 
yields increased rates of interracial marriage (Kalmijn, 1993; Fryer, 2007). Empirically, 
Kalmijn (1993) found a strong inverse relationship between relative group size and 
outmarriage: The smaller the proportion of black people is in a state, the greater the 
percentage of black people who marry white people. Fryer (2007), using self-reported 
friendship information, also found that as the share of the black student population 
increases, segregation increases dramatically. A rise in exposure to different races 
within a school district may create opportunities for black and white students’ 
friendship, romance, and sexual relationships. However, within integrated public 
schools, interracial contact can be limited, depending on the implementation details of 
the school officials and on student choices. Clotfelter (2006, p 127) suggests that 
segregation can take place at the level of classroom, lunchroom, and playing field. At 
the classroom level, he finds that some officials adopted some form of ability grouping, 
leading to segregation17. It is also possible that to retain white students in the public 
school system, the school has created rigorous academic programs within the school 
through tracking or developing merit-based courses. Wells et al. (2008) find that school 
desegregation increases extracurricular activities between races, especially among 
boys. However, the relationship generally does not extend to friendship beyond school. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  In some cases, socioeconomic status is largely correlated with tested abilities; thus, ability-grouped 
classrooms become race-segregated. In others, desegregation reflects the demands of white parents or the 
beliefs of teachers.	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As a result, it is not surprising that even within racially diverse schools, interracial 
friendships, especially close friendships, are relatively rare. Studies indicate that 
students are much more likely to name friends of the same race than friends of another 
race (Hallinan & Williams, 1989; Joyner & Kao, 2000).  
Improved Social Status   
Second, school integration may increase interracial relationships by improving 
black people’s education and labor market outcomes. Social exchange theory (Merton, 
1941; Balau, 1964; Kalmijn, 1993) asserts that individuals marry for social status. 
Assuming that for white people, the social cost of marrying across races is positive 
because of general social stigma, blacks must compensate for this cost by having 
superior objective characteristics. With improved education or labor market outcomes 
among blacks as a result of school integration (Bergman 2015; Guryan 2004; Johnson 
2011; Reber 2010), more interracial marriages may take place. However, despite 
increased opportunities for interaction in school and improved outcomes for black 
people, the cost of interacting with another race in the sphere of intimacy may be so 
high that it prohibits interracial romance. 
Commitment to Democracy  
 Lastly, school desegregation may expand relationships across racial lines 
because interaction with other groups or races in the school setting decreases 
discrimination and increases prosocial preferences. Wells et al. (2008) find that school 
desegregation leads students to be more open and tolerate of another race. Boisjoly et 
al. (2007) and Burns et al. (2013) found that being randomly assigned a roommate of a 
different race at college increases interracial social interactions in later years. Rao 
(2014) found that having poor classmates makes rich classmates more generous. 
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Positive attitudes of individuals toward members of other races can induce individuals 
to form and maintain interracial relationships (Wang, Kao, & Joyner, 2004). On the 
other hand, some studies do not find that education causes liberation from intergroup 
negativism or democratic commitment―even on a superficial level (Jacman & Muha, 
1984). Further, it is unclear whether beliefs reported in surveys and even in behavior 
games can be translated into behavioral changes in the most intimate relationships. 




2.4.1 Data   
	  
My primary source of data is the individual-level Vital Statistics Birth records 
available from county governments from 1970 to 2002. As explained by Roth (2000), 
this data is drawn from birth certificates and is supposed to cover virtually all births in 
the United States. In the United States, state laws require that birth certificates be 
completed for all births, and federal law mandates the national collection and 
publication of births and other vital statistics data. The information provided includes 
demographic data on date of birth, age and educational attainment of parents, marital 
status, number of births, race, sex, and geographic area. Health data include items such 
as birth weight, gestation, prenatal care, attendant at birth, and Apgar score. 
Geographic data include state, county, and city (available for cities with populations of 
250,000 or more until 1980 and populations of 100,000 or more after 1980).  
One limitation of the Vital Statistics data is that while they report the county where 
the mother gave birth as well as the county where the mother was born, they do not 
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allow me to observe the location where the mother received her education. To eliminate 
possible endogenous migration, I restrict my sample to mothers who were born and 
gave birth in the same state. It would be preferable if I can restrict the data to mothers 
who are born and give birth in the same county. However, the birth certificate data does 
not ask information on the county the mother is born into. Hence, my study is subject 
to the possible student migration in response to school desegregation within a state. 
This may cause upward bias in my results on racial attitudes, as discussed in the 
method section on white flight. While there is no evidence that blacks have migrated 
systematically school-age (Guryan, 2004), one may be concerned that blacks who were 
more open to biracial relationships migrated systemically after school and before birth 
to counties that desegregated earlier. However, if this takes place, I would observe a 
stable increase of biracial births for cohorts that were older than the age of 18 at the 
time of school desegregation. If my falsification test finds that school desegregation 
does not increase biracial births for these cohorts, it would provide an evidence that my 
results are  not driven by migration.  
In addition, I also examine explicitly the effect of school desegregation on 
"movers", women who were born and gave birth at a different state. I expect that 
school desegregation may also increase biracial birth for this group of women, but their 
results would be estimated with greater noise because they may have moved in 
different ages. 
I use county-level geographic information to link the Vital Statistics data to data on 
the timing of school desegregation compiled by Welch and Light (1987) for the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights. These data cover all school districts that in 1968 with 20–
90% minority with enrollments of 50,000 or more students, and a random sample of 
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districts that were 10–90% minority with enrollments of 15,000 to 50,000 students. 
This sample is not representative of all districts in the United States, but it is still of 
great interest, given that it accounts for a large share of minority students (Weiner et 
al., 2009).18  
The data on the timing of school desegregation is reported at the school district 
level, but most of the vital statistics data provide only county-level identifiers. I linked 
the Vital Statistics dataset with the data on the timing of desegregation at the county 
level for two reasons. First, city information is absent for cities of 250,000 or more 
prior to 1980. Second, even if city information were available for all counties, the 
county would be the preferred unit of analysis because it is less susceptible to problems 
of nonrandom attrition of the white population. Forty counties in the samples have 
school districts and counties that are coterminous (school district shares the same 
geographic boundary as the county). This means that if whites want to avoid school 
desegregation, they must migrate out of the county or attend private schools.  
     I restrict my window of analysis to 9 years before school desegregation and 12 years 
after school desegregation. As a robustness test, I also present the results with other 
event windows. Results are qualitatively the same if I widen the event window or 
restrict my analysis in different ways.  
2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
	  
Descriptive statistics are presented in table 1 and table 2. There are 3,042,141 
black mothers in my sample. Twenty-eight percent of them are first-time mothers. 
Among first-time births, 1% are reported as biracial births, and 38 percent do not have 
information on the father’s race reported. Black mothers’ average years of education at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The timing of school desegregation and county information is listed in Appendix Tables 1 and 2.  
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the time of birth is 12. Forty-nine percent are teenage mothers, 27 percent are married, 
and the average age at birth is 21.   
There are 8,163,953 white mothers in my sample. Thirty-six percent of them are 
first-time mothers. Among first-time births, 1% are reported as biracial births, and 9% 
do not have information on the father’s race information reported. The average years of 
education for white mothers at birth is 13. Twenty percent are teenage mothers, 81% 
are married, and the average age at birth is 24. 
The balanced samples look similar as the samples including all births. Mothers in 
the sample of all births are generally older than the sample of first birth mothers, and 
they are more likely to be married. 
2.4.3 Regression Specification 
	  
     My main estimating equation on biracial birth is as follows:  
𝑌! = 𝛼! + 𝜌!𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!－!
!!!"
!!!!
+ 𝜑! + 𝜔! + 𝜖! 
 
     In this equation,  𝑌! refers a dummy variable that measures the father's race，
𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!"equals one if the mother is exposed to n years of treatment and zero 
otherwise. 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛!－!refers to mothers who are exposed to -6 years to -9 
years of school desegregation. The omitted group refers to mothers who were exposed 
to -1 year of school desegregation. φ!refer to the year k in which the mother was born. 
ω!refer to the county j that the mother gives birth at. I cluster the standard error at the 
county level.    
      In addition, to summarize the return to years of school desegregation on biracial 
births, I estimate the following equation:   
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 𝑌! = 𝛼! + 𝜌!𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼 + 𝜑! + 𝜔! + 𝜖! 
In this equation, 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼 equals to 0 if the mother is not exposed to treatment; it 
equals to the years of exposure to treatment for treatment years equal or fewer than 7 
years; it equals to 7 if the years of exposure to treatment is greater than 7 years.  
Biracial Birth Outcomes 
I use mothers’ reports of the father’s race in determining whether the child is 
biracial19. When a mother is asked for information on the father’s race, she either 
chooses the father’s race category or chooses not to answer. There are two ways I code 
the child to be biracial. Take black mothers as an example: my first method is to code 
the biracial child as 1 if the mother reports the father to be white, and 0 otherwise 
(including if the mother does not report the father’s race). My second method is to code 
the biracial child as 1 if the mother reports the father to be white, and 0 if the mother 
reports the father to be black, restricting my analysis to mothers who report the father’s 
race. The caveat is that the results may be driven by changes in willingness to report 
the father’s race20 as opposed to actual changes in biracial births.  For example, an 
increase in biracial births only reflects an increased willingness to report the father’s 
race as opposed to an actual increase in biracial births. Thus, it is still a meaningful 
outcome because it measures a shift toward more open and tolerant attitudes towards 
the other race among individuals and society. On the other hand, perhaps school 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 While birth certificates report the child’s race, their policy with regard to reporting has changed. 
Before 1992, the child’s race was determined jointly by parents’ races. If either of the parents was not 
white, the child’s race was recorded as nonwhite. This prevents me from determining whether the child 
is biracial if the mother’s race is black. From 1992 to 2003, the child’s race was determined by the 
mother’s race, again preventing me from determining whether the child is biracial. It was not until 2003 
that there was a choice for the mother to fill out whether the child is multiracial. However, data from 
2002 or later does not have information on the mother’s state of birth. In addition, my control group and 
treatment group would be in their late 30s and early 40s after 2002, and it would not be very useful to 
analyze this information. 
 
20 The Vital Statistics codebook suggests that non-reporting of the father’s race is largely due to birth out 
of wedlock.	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desegregation may lead to more biracial birth among white mothers. However, because 
black fathers may be more likely to be absent (Mott, 1990), white mothers are 
increasingly unlikely to acknowledge the race of fathers. This may lead to a downward 
bias in our estimate. To address this concern, I examine explicitly whether school 
desegregation affects mothers’ reporting of the father’s race. I also examine the effect 
of school desegregation on marriage and willingness to report father’s education and 
father’s age to understand what contributes to non-reporting of the father’s race.21  
For my main outcome on children’s race, I provide results for mothers’ first birth. 
For robustness checks, I provide results for all births and examine the effect of school 
desegregation on the number of children conceived.  
2.4.4 Channels  
	  
I examine whether parental age, education, marriage status, and parity are possible 
channels that influence interracial birth outcomes. There is no missing information for 
mother’s age. However, the information on parental education reported by states has 
increased over time. In the Data Appendix, I describe which states started reporting 
when. Since I use state-specific cohort fixed effects, it lessens potential concerns about 
missing outcomes. However, my interpretation is limited to states and years that report 
the mother’s education.  
2.4.5 Balanced Panel  
	  
For main outcomes on biracial births and infant health, I provide results for mothers' 
first birth. I only examine parity, the number of children, using all samples. I focus on 
first-time births because later births can be affected by first births, and thus I would 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Concerns may arise that the state asks about the father’s race in different ways, but this change is not 
reflected in the birth certificate data. In addition, controlling for state-specific cohort fixed effects 
negates the effects of any reporting differences. 
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need more modeling to understand its effect.   I also present results using a balanced 
panel. The women who are in the control group are always older than women who are 
in the treatment group. Since the natality data does not start until 1970, I can not 
observe women who are giving birth before 1970. This means that for school district 
that desegregated in earlier years in the 1960s to 1970s, I can only observe the women 
from the control group who are giving birth at an older age. An unbalanced panel 
should not be an issue for the main analysis because I use cohort fixed effects. 
Nevertheless, I show balanced panel results as a robustness check. To balance counties, 
I limit my sample to women living in counties that desegregated after 1974 and those 
who were 10 to 21 years old at the time of school desegregation, so I can observe full 
childbearing outcomes from ages 17 to 35 for every mother in the sample.  However, 
the tradeoff is that I cannot observe the policy effect prior to 1974; thus, caution is 
required in interpreting the external validity of these findings. 
2.4.6 Subgroup Analysis  
	  
     I explore biracial births using subgroup analysis by mother's characteristics, school 
desegregation plan characteristics, and location. I adopt both the exposure index and 
the dissimilarity index from Welch and Light (1987) to construct subgroups. The 
exposure index measures the fraction of white students at the typical black student's 
school. It is calculated for each district using information on the count of white students 
and black students. The exposure index is sensitive to the racial composition of the 
district. As the fraction of students in the district that are white falls, the exposure index 
falls.    
     I also use the dissimilarity index, which measures school-level integration, 
conditional on the racial composition of the district. The dissimilarity index is 
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calculated using the fraction of black students and total enrollment. The numerator is 
the fraction of students who would have to change schools to completely integrate the 
district. The denominator is the fraction of students who would have to change schools 
to completely integrate the district if it began completely segregated. Thus, this index is 
inversely related to integration. I divide the counties into a group that made more than 
50-percentage-point change in the dissimilarity index as fully integrators another group 
that made less than 50-percentage-point change in the dissimilarity index as partial 
integrators. The first group contains one eighth of the entire black and white population 
in our sample.  
2.1.5. Results  
	  
2.5.1 Biracial Births among Black Mothers 
  
     To preview the results, I first present the effects of desegregation graphically 
estimated using equation (1) in figure 2. The y-axis denotes the probability of biracial 
births. The x-axis denotes the years to desegregation at the age of 18 for mothers. In 
other words, it is the number of years the mother is exposed to the treatment. For 
example, zero indicates that the mother was 18 and thus she was exposed to 0 years of 
desegregated school; one indicates that the mother was 17 and thus she was exposed to 
1 years of desegregated school. Panel 1 presents results estimated without any control. 
Panel 2 presents results estimated using county fixed effect. Panel 3 presents results 
estimated using county fixed effect and cohort fixed effect. Appendix Table 5 presents 
the corresponding estimated coefficients and standard errors.  
    Figure 2 Panel 3 presents clear graphical evidence that the share of biracial births is 
stable for the pre-trends. This lessens the concerns that a friendlier racial environment 
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led to school desegregation and biracial birth outcomes. The proportion of biracial 
births increases right after school desegregation, suggesting that desegregation leads to 
the birth of more biracial babies.   The graphical evidences provide motivation to 
explore how an increase of exposure to school desegregation affects biracial births.  To 
quantify the effects, I present a regression analysis that specifies non-treated as zero 
and examines the effect of school desegregation by year in Table 3. Column 1 presents 
results estimated without any control. Column 2 presents results estimated using county 
fixed effect. Column 3 presents results estimated using county fixed effect and cohort 
fixed effect. Column 4 presents all first birth by black mothers in the non-southern 
district. Column 5 presents all first birth by black mothers in the southern district. 
Similar to the figure, it finds that exposure to two years of school desegregation 
increases biracial births by 0.25 percentage points; exposure to five years of school 
desegregation increases biracial births by 0.36 percentage points; exposure to 7 years of 
school desegregation increases biracial births by 0.5 percentage points.  Column 4 and 
Column 5 suggest that while school desegregation in the non-southern states increase 
biracial births, school desegregation in the southern states do not.    
     To summarize this finding, I also specify the treatment to be continuous up to year 
7. More specifically, it equals to 0 if the mother is not exposed treatment; it equals to 
the years of treatment if years of treatment are equal or fewer than 7 years; it equals to 
7 if the years of treatment is greater than 7 years. Table 4 presents the corresponding 
results. Column 3 suggests that exposure to one more year of school desegregation 
increases biracial births by 0.08 percentage points. In other words, exposure to 5 year 
of school desegregation increases biracial births by 0.4 percentage points; exposure to 7 
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years of school desegregation increases biracial births by 0.56 percentage points. This 
is qualitatively equivalent to the finding using event-study analysis.  
     This result is robust to different specifications of the treatment: in Appendix Table 
10, I changed the specification from up to 7 years of school desegregation to up to 5, 6, 
8, 9 years of school desegregation. The results remain similar. To further gauge the 
robustness of the results, I focus on non-southern states and adopt different cohort fixed 
effect in appendix Table 11. Column 1 presents results with county fixed effect and 
region-specific cohort fixed effect; column 2 presents results with county fixed effect 
and division-specific cohort fixed effect; column 3 presents results with county fixed 
effect and state-specific cohort fixed effect; column 4 presents results with county fixed 
effect and state-specific cohort fixed effect with state-specific time trend; column 5 is 
similar to column 4 but presents results for the entire sample.  This table suggests that 
the results are robust to using region-specific and division-specific fixed effect. 
However, the variation between the counties within a state to explore the return to the 
length of exposure is limited, hence it is not surprising to see that while it is still 
positive at a similar magnitude, it is no longer statistically significant. Thus, in panel b, 
while limiting to six years before and after the treatment, I specify the treatment to be 
one if one is exposed to school desegregation and otherwise. I have found that being 
ever exposed to school desegregation increases biracial birth by 0.5 to 0.7 percentage 
points and it is statistically significant at the five percent level. This result is robust to 
using all children as opposed to the first child and non-first children. The result is also 
robust to using balanced panel (Appendix Table 12). 
     To put the coefficient size into perspective, in 1970, the share of biracial births was 
0.8% between black women and white men. This share increased to 1.9% in 1980 and 
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3.3% in 1990. If the return to school desegregation is linear with respect to time, using 
a conservative measure of 0.5 percentage points, school desegregation has contributed 
to one half of the increase in biracial births between 1970 and 1980 and one fifth of the 
increase in biracial births between 1970 and 1990.    
Exploring Mechanisms I explore descriptively whether mother's education and 
mother's age at birth explain the increase of biracial births (Appendix 18). Adding 
mother’s education and mother's age decreases the coefficient on the years of treatment 
slightly. This suggests that these two variables could potentially be at work for an 
increase of biracial births, but they do not play an important role in explaining the 
effect of school desegregation.   Alternatively, I also explore the mechanical effect of 
increasing of exposure on biracial children. Controlling for cohort fixed effect, one 
percentage point increase of exposure index increases biracial birth by 0.08 percentage 
points. Since the average change in exposure index is 22 percent, if all of the change in 
biracial birth is due to change in exposure rate, this would result in a 1.6 percentage 
point increase in biracial birth. This suggests that the mechanical effect of exposure 
increase can possibly explain a substantial portion of the increase of biracial birth by 
school desegregation. 
Exploring Inter-marriage A natural question to ask is whether school desegregation 
has also increased interracial marriage. To answer this question, I explore heterogeneity 
of black mothers by marriage status. I find that school desegregation induces more 
biracial birth for married women. While I find that years of school desegregation is 
associated with a 0.02% increase in biracial births for non-married couples, this finding 
is not statistically significant. Since school desegregation does not affect the probability 
of marriage (Table 7), assuming that school desegregation does not contribute to more 
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or fewer intermarried couples ever giving birth, one can conclude that school 
desegregation increases biracial birth protected by marriage for black women.   
This paper finds that school desegregation increases biracial birth and 
interracial marriage. However, this is not an ideal dataset to explore the outcome for 
interracial marriage, because it is limited to people who have children.  
School desegregation increases biracial child and increases interracial marriage, 
but does not affect the overall marriage rate. Naturally this implies that it crowds out 
within-race birth and marriage. Is this problematic? As discussed in the introduction, if 
people mated randomly across races, black/white biracial births would account for 
more than 9% of all births. This suggests that the current biracial ratio (2.5%) level is 
still very low, and more integration could be achieved.  
 
Heterogeneity   Table 14 explores the heterogeneous effect of school desegregation 
using subgroup analysis. Several interesting patterns emerged. First, it increases 
biracial birth for both disadvantaged group and relatively advantaged groups, but it 
increases more for relatively advantaged group, as measured by marriage status, 
education level, and teenage status. Second, it is consistent with previous analysis has 
shown that the results are largely driven by non-southern counties, which has higher 
levels of initial exposure rate and relatively lower levels of dissimilarity changes.  
Third, it finds that the effect size is five times bigger in involuntary plan (including 
pairing and clustering, pairing and clustering with rezoning, pairing and clustering with 
magnets, rezoning, rezoning with magnets) than voluntary plan. Fourth, it finds that the 
effect of school desegregation is mainly driven by large urban school districts.     
2.5.2 Ruling Out Alternative Hypotheses 
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Examining Reporting Bias   I probe the effect of school desegregation on non-
reporting of father's race and find that school desegregation has no effect on this 
outcome. I also find that school desegregation does not affect reporting of father's age, 
reporting of mother's education, or marriage status at the time of birth (Appendix Table 
15). This dispels concerns that the increase in biracial births is reflecting willingness to 
report the father's race.       
Endogenous Moving While Guryan (2004) dispels the concern that blacks have 
migrated systematically at school age, one may be concerned that black women who 
have more education migrated to counties that desegregated earlier after school age. I 
examine this concern in using alternative specification of equation (1), in which 
measures of policy implementation when the mother was 18 to 22 years old are added 
to the specification (1) (Table 15). Finding that school desegregation matters for this 
group of women would cast doubt on the empirical strategy. The coefficients on policy 
implementation at age 17 or younger remain similar to previous estimate, confirming 
that this measure of school desegregation has a positive effect on biracial births. The 
coefficients on policy change at later ages (at age 18 to 22 years old) are small and not 
statistically significant. I perform an F-test to test whether the coefficients on policy 
implementation at 17 or younger are equal to the coefficients on 18 to 22, and I always 
reject this restriction. Thus, this table provides evidence that it is school desegregation 
at age 17 or younger rather than at older age that matters.   
     In addition, I examine whether school desegregation affects the mothers who were 
born in a different state as they give birth (Appendix Table 16). First, I pool this group 
together with the non-movers and found that school desegregation increases biracial 
children for all mothers. While being exposed to more years of school desegregation is 
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also positively associated with having biracial children for movers, it is noisily 
estimated and no longer statistically significant. These two pieces of evidence provide 
some confidence that my results are not driven by underlying trends in counties or by 
the migration of women who are seeking jobs in the county that desegregated earlier.   
     I also explore whether school desegregation affects the probability of having a 
biracial child with race other than black and white, such as Asian and black child 
(Appendix Table 16).  Each state and even county differ in their regulation in terms of 
the mixing of non-black students in traditionally black or white schools. Hence, the 
implementation of school desegregation may not necessarily affect the mixing of race 
of Asian and black. I have found that while school desegregation is positively 
correlated with having a biracial child other than black and white, but it is not 
statistically significant.    
     I find that school desegregation also increases biracial birth for teen moms. Because 
teens are more likely to stay in the county that they attended high school, this is an 
additional piece of evidence that our results are not driven by endogenous migration.  
Delay in Implementation   Johnson (2011) criticized the empirical approach taken by 
Guryan (2004) and Weiner et al. (2009), suggesting that while the court-ordered timing 
is exogenous, the actual implementation date is not. More specifically, he suggested 
that before 1964, groups opposed to integration could delay desegregation plans. 
Enforcement of desegregation did not begin in earnest until the mid-1960s. The 
enactments of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Title I of the 1965 Elementary 
and Secondary Education Act prohibited the distribution of federal aid to segregated 
schools. They allowed the Justice Department to join lawsuits against school districts 
that were in violation of the Brown v. Board of Education. Hence, as calculated by 
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Johnson (2011), there was more than a 10 year delay in the implementation of court 
orders before 1965, and on average, there were only one to two years of delay after the 
initial order post-1965. These delays are potentially endogenous: Districts with a larger 
minority population, greater per-capita school spending, and a smaller proportion of 
residents with low income were associated with longer delays in major desegregation 
implementation following court orders.   The lack of pre-trend for the outcomes of 
interest mitigates concerns about endogenous school desegregation implementation.  
     Furthermore, in my subgroup analysis, I examine the school desegregation effect by 
implementation timing. School desegregation post-1965 is less susceptible to 
endogenous implementation timing because most of the school districts implemented 
the court orders immediately by then. The finding that school desegregation affects 
biracial births after 1965 suggests that my results are robust in counties with short time 
of implementation delays (Appendix Table 14).      
Repeals of Anti-miscegenation Laws   With the exception of 12 states, all states in the 
United States at some time had anti-miscegenation laws, which forbade marriages 
across races. Most states repealed such laws before 1900, but 16 states (mostly in the 
South) had anti-miscegenation laws in place until, in the case of Loving v. Virginia in 
1967, the Supreme Court declared these laws unconstitutional. Hence, it is possible that 
the overturning of anti-miscegenation laws, as opposed to school desegregation, was 
the main factor driving increases in biracial births.   Anti-miscegenation laws should 
affect everyone in the same county equally, not just those who were exposed to school 
desegregation. To focus on the variation caused by school desegregation, I only 
compare birth outcomes within the same county, and I control for cohort fixed effects. 
In addition, I find strong positive and statistically significant effect of school 
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desegregation in states that were not affected by anti-miscegenation laws, suggesting 
that the repeal of anti-miscegenation laws was not the driving cause behind the increase 
in biracial births (Appendix Table 14).     
2.5.3 Effects on Other Fertility and Family Decisions 
	  
      Table 6 and Table 7 explore the effect of school desegregation on family and 
fertility decisions. There is evidence that school desegregation increases black mothers' 
years of education at birth by 0.12 years in the southern states. It can also be interpreted 
as school desegregation increases 1 year of education for 12% of the black female 
students. This effect size is greater than those found in previous literature. Guryan 
(2001) has found that school desegregation reduced high school dropout rates for black 
students by 2 to 3 percentage points. If students dropped out in the beginning of their 
senior year or junior year, his finding would translate into an increase of 0.02 to 0.06 
years of schooling. Thus, assuming that black students drop out in the beginning of 
their junior year, the size of coefficient estimated using birth certificate data is two 
times the size of that measured using census data as estimated by Guryan (2001).  This 
difference in effect size may have several causes. First, I am examining the effect of 
school desegregation on mothers' age and education at birth; I am not measuring 
complete education. Black mothers may not be receiving more education, but they have 
delayed pregnancy in school years. Second, the difference in effect size may be a result 
of a composition change: more educated mothers are giving birth. Third, the school 
desegregation effect for black women may be bigger than the effect for black men. 
Lastly, I may be estimating a more precise effect because I am examining year-to-year 
changes as opposed to 10-year changes. I do not find evidence on the effect of school 
desegregation on being married or the number of children.      
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     It is important to acknowledge that while the result is statistically significant, 
the effect size is not large: the average school year is 180 days, so this is just a matter 
of 18 days or so. If one assumes that one year of schooling is good for a 10 percent 
earnings differential, gains in education of this magnitude are good for 1 percent or so. 
It is also useful to understand its effect size in comparison with estimates using other 
type of school programs. For example, Perry pre-school increases the college-going 
rate by 2 percentage points (Chetty et al. 2010). This can be translated into 0.04 years 
of schooling if students finish community colleges and 0.08 years of schooling if 
students complete four-year universities. A standard deviation of teacher quality as 
measured by value-add estimate increases college-going rate by 0.5 percentage points. 
This can be translated into 0.01 years of schooling for community college completion 
or 0.02 years of four-year universities completion. Thus, while the effect size of school 
desegregation is small, it is about the same effect, if not bigger, than the intervention of 
preschool and an improvement of teacher quality. In addition, as it would be discussed 
in the later section, it is important to note that this may be a lower bound of the true 
school desegregation effect. 
     In analysis using division-specific fixed effect, I find that school desegregation 
increases mother’s age by 0.3 years and reduces teenage birth by 5 percentage points 
(Appendix Table 24 and 25). I also find that school desegregation increases fathers' 
years of education by 0.09 years (Table 26). This estimate is comparable to the increase 
in mothers' education. This may be due to the comparable effect of school 
desegregation, as the policy raises women and men's education or age at birth. 
Alternatively, it may be due to changes in pairing, wherein more educated mothers find 
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more educated fathers. As a result, more educated fathers are more likely to have 
children.     
      Lastly, while there is no effect of school desegregation on marriage rate, there is 
some evidence that school desegregation increases the use of prenatal care by 2 to 3 
percentage points. An earlier adoption of prenatal care is one of the possible channels 
of how an improved education through school desegregation can positively affects 
infant health.     
2.5.4 Results for White Mothers 
	  
     I do not find school desegregation increases biracial births for white mothers 
(Appendix Table 29 and 30). However, I find that school desegregation is associated 
with more white mothers having biracial children in counties that have increased 
dissimilarity index by more than 50 percentage points. In these counties, school 
desegregation is associated with a 3% increase in biracial births by white mother/black 
father pairs. This finding is statistically significant at the 1% level. Results on white 
women should be interpreted with caution. If only white households with unfriendly 
attitudes toward black people leave the school district because of school desegregation, 
I would be estimating the effect of endogenous migration. Exploiting county-level 
variation mitigates this concern if white women attend private school within the 
county. School desegregation is associated with an increase in biracial births for all 
married couples. As school desegregation does not affect the probability of marriage, if 
school desegregation does not lead to more inter-married couples ever giving birth, one 
can conclude that school desegregation is associated with more intermarriage.    
     I do not find evidence that school desegregation affects other family formation or 
fertility behavior among white mothers. This finding is consistent with Guryan (2002), 
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where he did not find that school desegregation had a positive effect on white students' 
high school dropout rates.    
     It is unclear how the school quality changed for white mothers as there are 
simultaneous changes of peer effect and resources. In addition, if endogenous 
migration by socioeconomic status is occurring, the direction of my results on white 
mothers' education should be biased downward, as more resourceful families would 
leave the county. As I did not find any effect on white mother's education, these results 
suggest that school desegregation has not harmed white families.  
2.5.5 Discussion of the Results  
	  
Regional Differences  In summary, the effect of school desegregation on biracial birth 
took place in the non-southern districts. The effect of school desegregation on infant 
health and mother’s education took place in southern district.  
Non-southern districts differ in several important ways from the southern 
districts. First, southern districts practiced de jure segregation, whereas non-southern 
districts practiced de facto segregation. Hence, the initial court-ordered desegregation 
were only targeted towards the southern district. Its legal segregation did not begin in 
earnest until 1973 Keyes vs. Denver School district decision (413 U.S. 189), which 
ruled that court-ordered litigation applied to areas which has not practiced de jure 
segregation.  Second, perhaps not surprisingly, before school desegregation, non-
southern districts have higher level of exposure rate. Third, geographic pattern of the 
school is different: southern school districts are more likely to be coterminous (school 
district shares the same geographic boundary as the county). 41% of the population in 
the sample in the southern district lived in coterminous counties, and only 10% of the 
population in the sample in the non-southern states lived in coterminous counties. 
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Lastly, the desegregation differed: southern school districts are also more likely to 
involuntary plans than non-southern districts.  
Given these large geographic and population differences between the southern 
and non-southern districts, it is perhaps not surprising that the impacts of school 
desegregation on black students are differential. For example, if the discrimination 
level is lower for non-southern districts, the opportunity to interact would stimulate 
more interracial relationships. If there is more improvement of resources, student 
aspirations, and parental commitment in the southern districts because of school 
desegregation, it can bring more long-term benefits for the students, which would be 
reflected in the increase of mother’s education and infant health. 
This paper can not provide a satisfactory explanation to why the effect differs, 
but it attempts to provide some descriptive evidence to shed light on how even 
mechanical effect of more exposure can have differential impact. More specifically, in 
non-southern regions, I have found that an increase of exposure is associated with an 
increase in biracial birth (Appendix Table 33). However, in southern region, I have 
found that somewhat puzzling, an increase of exposure is associated with a decrease in 
biracial birth. While the mechanical effect of exposure to white students reduces 
preterm births in all regions, its effect is twice as big in the southern regions (Appendix 
Table 34). Lastly, while the change of exposure does not affect mother’s education in 
the non-southern region, it has a strong and positive effect on mother’s education in the 
southern region. This exercise sheds us some light on how an increase of exposure led 
by school desegregation has differential impact in different regions.  
Intention to Treat  This paper provides only estimates of intention to treat effect. First, 
in non-coterminous counties, I am using the earliest date of school desegregation 
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within the county. This suggests that I would be assigning students in school districts 
that desegregated later as treatment. Forty school districts share the same border line as 
the county. Thus, for the other counties, some samples are considered to receive 
treatment while they are not. As discussed in the data section, the advantage of treating 
these students as treated is to deal with the potential endogenous migration problem 
within county.  
In addition, I am estimating the average effect of school desegregation. There 
are heterogeneities across school districts that desegregation, with some school districts 
fully integrated and other schools integrating at a much less scale. Even within 
desegregated schools, classroom, lunchroom, and playground can still be segregated 
(Wells et al., 2008; Clotfelter, 2006). Hence, I am measuring the overall effect of 
school desegregation, but students may not really experience desegregated education.  
Third, I assign the treatment status based on women’s age relative to 18 at the 
time of school desegregation. If an individual ages 16 at the time of school 
desegregation, but has dropped out of the school before the implementation of school 
desegregation, one is again counted as treated in the sample. Since school 
desegregation also affects the probability of dropping out, it is difficult to 
simultaneously take into account of drop-out status and school desegregation.  
This paper finds that school desegregation increases biracial birth and improves 
infant health. However, because of the reasons stated above, there is a strong reason to 
expect that the effects are attenuated.  In other words, it is important to note that this 
may be a lower bound of the true school desegregation effect. 
Biracial Children and Their Life-Long Outcomes In addition to the interest in using 
biracial birth as a measurement of racial integration, one may also be interested in the 
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outcomes of biracial children. Are they actually better off as a result of this micro-level 
racial interaction? Birth certificate data can only provide suggestive evidences on this 
question by examining their initial health condition. I find that the percentage of low 
birth weight and preterm birth is 10 percent and 13 percent for black-white biracial 
child, 12 percent and 15 percent for black child, and 6 percent and 8 percent for white 
child. This suggests that the health condition for the biracial child is better than a black 
child, but worse than a white child. Fryer et al. (2012) provides a more detailed 
discussion on the life-long outcomes of biracial children. They have found that on a 
host of background and achievement characteristics as well as adult outcomes, mixed 
race individuals fall in between whites and blacks. However, they may be more likely 
to engage in risky and anti-social adolescent behavior. They argue that mixed race 
adolescents’ behavior is consistent with a two sector Roy model (Roy 1951), in which 
all adolescents face pressure to conform to peer norms. Mixed race children have 
higher cost to group acceptance, so they engage in riskier behavior. This paper reveals 
the complexity of being a biracial child, its impact on child’s integration to the society, 
and one’s success in the society. Nevertheless, they do not have particularly bad adult 
outcomes (Fryer et al., 2012). More studies are needed to understand biracial children’s 
identity formation and social integration in the society. It would also provide insight to 
understand biracial child’s long-term outcome by parental marriage status.  
2.6 Conclusion 
	  
Rising biracial birth rates are changing the United States’ demography in a 
fundamental way. Individuals who identify as being of more than one race have 
become a more common part of discussions and understandings of race and ethnicity 
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(Jones and Bullock, 2010). Reflecting the growing trend in biracial and multiracial 
identities, the 2000 census questionnaire provided the option to self-identify as 
belonging to more than one race, and starting in 2003, some states began offering the 
option to denote multiple races for infants on birth certificates (Jones & Bullock, 2010).  
This paper presents the first causal evidence on determinants of biracial births. 
Using multiple difference-in-difference frameworks that exploit the variation in the 
timing of school desegregation, I find that black mothers are more likely to produce 
biracial babies as a result of school desegregation. School desegregation also increases 
maternal education and age at birth for black mothers. In addition, I find school 
desegregation is associated with an increase in maternal education at birth and biracial 
births for white mothers.  
School desegregation has changed the education experience for black students in 
aspects of resources and peer effect. While this chapter cannot pin down the 
mechanisms of improved outcomes to peer effect, it is important to note that peer effect 
does not only refer to social interactions that took place in school, peer effect also 
affects resources, teacher expectations, and social norms in a school. Hence, it is 
important to think of school desegregation as a package that improves education 
outcomes for blacks based on a race-policy.   
Many of school districts that desegregated in the 1970s and 1980s are being 
released from court-mandated desegregation plans (Lutz, 2011; Reardon et al., 2012). 
As a result, school districts are become substantially more segregated again, inducing 
decreases in academic performance and increases in crime in affected districts (Bilings 
et al., 2013). Thus, a full appreciation of the effects of school desegregation is 
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especially important in understanding its role in shaping the long-run outcomes for 
blacks.   




Education is widely believed to be a determinant of earnings, health, children’s 
health and academic outcomes, and overall life quality. This belief is well supported by 
empirical research (see literature review by Oreoplous and Salvanes, 2011). However, 
most of these studies focus on examining the return to education quantity as opposed to 
education quality.  
Understanding whether education quality matters helps policymakers decide 
whether to invest additional resources to improve school quality. This information also 
helps parents decide where to send their children to school.  Recent literature has 
attempted to estimate the returns to education quality, focusing on academic 
achievement and labor market outcomes.22 However, few empirical studies have 
estimated the non-pecuniary benefits of school quality.  
This study seeks to provide evidence linking the qualities of the schools that 
mothers attended and their infants’ health outcomes. We care about infant health 
because it is a good predictor of individuals’ lifelong outcomes. Currie and Hyson 
(1999) show that poorer infant health has long-term negative impacts on test scores, 
employment probabilities, and wages among young adults.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 For returns of university quality on completion and in the labor market: Berg-Dale and Krueger 
(2002), Black and Smith (2004), Black and Smith (2006), Dale and Krueger (2011), Cohodes and 
Goodman (2013), Hoekstra (2009), Saavedra (2009), Sekhri and Rubinstein (2010). Returns on academic 
outcomes to schools: Abdulkadiroglu, Angrist, and Pathak (2014), Clark (2010), Dulfo, Dupas, and 
Kremer (2011), Jackson (2010), and Pop-Eleches and Urquiola (2013).  
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Theoretically, higher quality education can increase the years of education mothers 
obtain, which may lead to an increase in mothers’ permanent income through earnings, 
improvement in the quality of their mates (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2002), and 
improvement in their knowledge and adoption of healthier pregnancy behavior 
(Grossman 1972). In addition, even in the absence of an increase of educational 
attainment, schools with better quality may improve mothers’ outcomes directly 
through improvement in income, mates, and knowledge regarding pregnancy behavior. 
However, empirical evidence has not reached a consensus on whether more years of 
school induce better infant health (Currie and Moretti 2003; Oreopoulos et al. 2003; 
McCrary and Royer 2010; Sandra et al. 2005). Whether better schools benefit long-run 
health outcomes also remains an important open question.   
To understand the effect of school quality on infant health, this paper exploits the 
exogenous timing in the implementation of school desegregation policies across 
counties. In 1954, the United States Supreme Court ruled that separating schools for 
blacks and whites was “inherently unequal.” Over the next 30 years, school districts 
desegregated under court orders. Chapter 2 provided a detailed discussion on how 
school desegregation has improved school quality for black students through two 
channels. To summarize, first, it increases the average resources experienced by an 
average black student exposed to school desegregation. Second, it increases the 
exposure of white students.  Previous literature documented the positive overall effect 
of school desegregation on blacks’ outcomes. School desegregation increased years of 
education and improved education outcomes (Bergman 2015; Guryan 2004; Johnson 
2011; Reber 2010); improved health and labor market outcomes (Ashenfelter, Collins, 
and Yoon 2006; Johnson 2011), and reduced local crime rates (Johnson 2011; Weiner, 
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Lutz, and Ludwig 2009;). However, it is still unclear whether  school desegregation can 
provide intergenerational benefits for blacks.  
My study addresses this question using similar dataset and empirical approach as 
chapter two. To summarize, I use individual-level birth certificate information. Birth 
certificates provide basic information on parental characteristics and infant health. I 
exploit county, as well as cohort, variation, taking advantage of the difference in 
plausibly exogenous implementation timing across counties, with treatment affecting 
only cohorts of children in school-age at the time of implementation. More specifically, 
I compare the fertility outcomes from age 15 to 40 for women who were 18 or older at 
the time of desegregation and, therefore, were not exposed to desegregated K-12 
schools with those for women who were younger than 18 at the time of desegregation 
and, therefore, were exposed to desegregated schools. I use state-specific cohort fixed 
effect to allow for secular changes over cohorts. In addition, I use county fixed effect. 
Hence it is not necessary that the timing of policy change be unrelated to county 
characteristics.  
I find that for black mothers, school desegregation improves infant health. I also 
find school desegregation increases maternal education and age at birth. These are 
potential channels that lead to improved infant health outcomes.  
Section 2 provides a literature review. I am using the same data and empirical 
strategy as in Chapter 3 of this dissertation. For conciseness, I will skip these two 
sections and go directly into the descriptive data and results section. Section 3 provides 
additional information on data. Section 4 presents results and summarizes.  
Literature Review  
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This paper contributes to research on mother’s education and infant health (Currie 
and Moretti 2003; McCrary and Royer 2010; Oreopoulos et al. 2003; Sandra et al. 
2005). I contribute to this line of literature by examining all black females who are 
affected by school desegregation, a much larger group by population size.  Currie and 
Moretti (2003) use the opening of new colleges to identify the effect of maternal 
education on infant health. Thus, they are focusing on white females who are likely to 
have more education23. McCrary and Royer (2011) use age-at-school-entry policies to 
identify the effect of mother education on fertility and infant health. Thus, their level of 
variation is identified from young women who are at risk of dropping out of school24. 
In addition, this study focuses on the return to school quality, as opposed to the return 
on school quantity or years of schooling. The literature in this field is scant. Sandra et 
al. 2005 uses the effect of change in compulsory education to identify the effect of an 
increase of mother’s education on children’s test scores. While they mentioned that 
school quality is also increased as measured by school resources, they can not 
differentiate the effect of school quality change from quantity change.  The most 
relevant empirical paper is Kaufmann and Messner (2013); using regression 
discontinuity, they find that being admitted to a higher ranked university has substantial 
returns in terms of partner quality for female students in Chile. My study is different as 
I focus on fertility outcomes with K−12 education for all students.   
Current evidence on school integration and infant health has mixed findings. Liu et 
al. (2012) compare teen pregnancy in school districts that desegregated in 1970 and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The women whose schooling attainment at motherhood is affected by college openings are those 
women with a high level of education generally. More specifically, they do not find college openings 
affect black women's schooling.  
24 A woman who drops out of school at the earliest age allowed under a typical compulsory school law 
will have fewer years of education if she starts school late (Angrist and Krueger 1992). Thus their 
estimate is most relevant for women at risk of dropping out of school.  
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those that desegregated in 1980, and find that school desegregation decreases black 
women’s rates of teenage pregnancy. I refine their empirical strategy by exploiting 
variation in the year in which school desegregation takes place. However, my results 
are different from those of Bifulco et al. (2015), who find that school desegregation 
increases black women’s likelihood of giving birth as teenagers. This is probably due 
to a difference in empirical strategy: Bifulco et al. (2015) compare teenage pregnancy 
before and after the implementation of school desegregation within a county, 
controlling for birth year. However, they fail to control for cohort fixed effects. Hence, 
their result may be reflecting cohort differences.25 The research design of this paper can 
be thought of as a refinement of Bifulco et al.’s (2015) and Liu et al.’s (2012) 
estimation strategies. It replaces the year differences with a cohort times state fixed 
effect and county fixed effect. In addition, I extend their paper by going beyond the 
number of children to looking at infant health outcomes.   
Lastly, the current paper adds to an understanding of the effects of school 
desegregation beyond educational achievement (Bifulco et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2012; 
Guryan, 2004; Reber, 2010; Johnson, 2011; Lutz, 2011; Ludwig et al., 2012; Johnson, 
2011; Billings et al., 2013; Bergman, 2015). It is consistent with previous literature in 
that it finds school desegregation increases education among black students (Guryan, 
2004; Reber, 2010; Johnson, 2011; Bergman, 2015).  
Data and Regression  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 In addition, the data are unbalanced in the sense that at the beginning of the years with data availability 
(1968), I can only observe people in earlier cohorts who give birth at an older age. At the end of the 
years with data availability (1988), I can only observe people in later cohorts who give birth at a young 
age. Hence, without controlling for cohorts, I am more likely to observe later cohorts giving birth at a 
younger age. 
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3.3.1 Data  
	  
Birth weight is the weight of the infant at birth. If the infant is born under 3700 
grams, it is considered to be low birth weight. Gestational age measures the age of a 
pregnancy, which is calculated using the difference between the birth date and the first 
day of the last menstrual period. The infant is considered to born prematurely if the 
gestational age is shorter than 37 weeks. I use this definition for the preterm birth 
outcome26. Not all states reported gestational age in the 1970s. More specifically, there 
are 12 states that did not report gestational age for some years. In addition, even for 
reporting states, mothers were able to choose whether or not to report last date, month, 
or year of menstrual period. For first-time black mothers, 19.8 percent of the 
gestational data are missing, with 6.4 percent due to state non-reporting and 13.4 
percent due to self-non-reporting. For first-time white mothers, 13.4 percent of the 
gestational data are missing, with 6 percent due to state non-reporting and 7.4 percent 
due to self-non-reporting. I have partially corrected the missing data issue by assuming 
that the date of the last menstrual period is day 15 of the month for a mother who 
reports last month and year of menstrual period. This decreases the percentage of self-
non-reporting to 6.7 percent for black women and 4.4 percent for white women.  
3.3.2 Descriptive Data 
	  
I focus on first-time birth for my main analysis. I only examine the number of 
children using all samples. I focus on first-time births because later births can be 
affected by first births, and thus I would need more modeling to understand its effect.  
Table 2 from chapter 2 provides descriptive statistics. Infants born to black 
mothers are, on average, less healthy than those born to white mothers as they are twice 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 In addition, I will provide analysis for other cutoff points for preterm birth and low birth weight.  
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as likely to be born with low birth weight and/or at prematurity. For black mothers, 13 
percent of infants are of low birth weight and 16% are of preterm birth.  For white 
mothers, 6 percent of infants are of low birth weight and 8% are of preterm birth.  
3.3.3 Regression Specification 
	  
I identify whether one is exposed to school desegregation using cohort information 
and county information. My main estimating equation is as follows:  
𝑦! = 𝑐 + 𝑐!𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡! + 𝑐!𝐶𝑜ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡!"𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝑐!𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑦!" +   ε!" 
In this equation, 𝑦! refers to a dummy variable that measures the father’s race. 
Treatmenti is a dummy that equals 1 if individual i is 17 or younger at the time of 
desegregation and 0 if individual i is older than 17 at the time of desegregation. Cohortk 
refers to the year k in which the mother was born. Countyj refers to the county j that the 
mother was born in and lives in. CohortikStates refers to state-specific cohort fixed 
effects. I cluster the standard error at the county times the mother’s birth year level.  
Results  
3.1.1 Infant Health among Black Mothers  
	  
Regression results suggest that school desegregation reduces preterm birth by 
0.6 percentage points (Table 3). In addition, school desegregation reduces preterm birth 
by 1.7 percentage points in the southern states. This result is statistically significant at 
the 1% level and is robust to sample restrictions, state-specific cohort fixed effect, and 
state-specific time trend. The reduction of preterm birth is driven by school 
desegregation inducing the mothers who are giving birth at the 31st to 37th weeks to 
40th weeks (Appendix Table 18). Subgroup analysis suggests that this has benefited 
	   	   	   	   	  
 54 
largely for the women who were not married or were teenager when giving the first 
birth and women who have 12 years of education (Appendix Table 20).   As suggested 
by table 19, while having more education and fewer teenage births do not explain the 
effect of school desegregation on infant health, the effect of school desegregation on 
preterm birth is equivalent to an increase of mother’s education by one year. This 
finding is consistent with findings by Currie and Moretti's (2001), where they find that 
an additional year of maternal education reduces the risk of prematurity by 0.4 
percentage points. The difference in preterm births between black and white mothers is 
8 percentage points. This suggests that school desegregation reduces the black and 
white gap by 1/6 in the southern states.  I do not find that school desegregation affects 
the probability of low birth weight. However, this is not surprising, given that preterm 
births from 33rd weeks to 37th weeks are associated with more than 2500 gram of 
infant birth weight, which is higher than the cutoff for low birth weight.   
 “Fetal Origins” hypothesis suggests that there is a significant association 
between infant birth and the development of chronic diseases in adulthood, such as 
diabetes, hypotension, and cardiovascular disease (Barker 1992; Barker et al. 1989, 
1993; Vagero and Leon 1994; Leon et al. 2000, and Innes et al. 202; see Rasmussen 
(2001) provides a review of the literature.) Economic literature has also found that poor 
infant health is correlated with lower educational attainment, poorer self-reported 
health status, and reduced employment and earning among adult (Behrman, 
Rosenzweig, and Taubman 1994; Currie and Hyson 1999; and Behrman and 
Rosenzweig 2001). Thus, this paper provides previously undocumented multiplier 
effect on the benefits of school desegregation.  
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3.4.2 Mechanisms   
	  
Other outcomes In chapter two table 4, I explore other outcomes related to birth 
outcomes. To summarize, I find that school desegregation increases black mothers' 
years of education at birth by 0.07 years. In addition, it increases mothers' age at the 
time of birth by 0.11 years and reduces the probability of giving birth as a teenager by 
1.4 percentage points. The increase of parental education and decrease of teenage 
fertility may be important pathways to an improvement of infant health.  However, for 
the limitation of the data and the design of this study, I cannot isolate the specific 
channels of how infant health is improved.  
Exploring Length to Exposure It is also natural to ask whether the length of exposure 
to integrated schools affects student outcomes. The interaction results in Table 13 
(appendix 6) sheds light on this question. The specification asks whether an additional 
year exposure to school desegregation has additional impact on biracial births or infant 
health. There is no evidence that length to exposure to integration has a compounding 
effect on outcome of interests.  
3.1.3 Ruling Out Alternative Hypotheses 
	  
Examining Reporting Bias   I probe the effect of school desegregation on gestational 
age. The timing of the last menstrual period, the information used to calculate 
gestational age, is self-reported and there is evidence that school desegregation may 
change mother's likelihood of reporting, thereby resulting in a compositional change of 
those that report. To examine the extent of this bias, I regress self-selected non-
reporting on exposure to school policy. I find that school desegregation is associated 
with a 1.2 percentage point rise in non-reporting (Appendix Table 2).  
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     Non-reporting of gestational age is generally associated with lower birth weight as 
well as other negative outcomes (Appendix Table 3). I correct for missing data partially 
by using the month and year of last menstrual period to estimate the length of 
gestational age (Appendix Table 4). This helps reduce the missing data on gestational 
age for the black mothers by 7 percentage points. I continue to find that school 
desegregation decreases preterm birth by 6 percentage points. In addition, school 
desegregation is no longer statistically significantly associated with missing 
information (Appendix Table 2). This provides us with some confidence that even if 
school desegregation leads to non-reporting of gestational age by day, the overall effect 
on infant health is still positive.    
3.1.4 Results for White Mothers    
	  
Infant Health Chapter 2 discusses that it is unclear how the school quality changed for 
white mothers as there are simultaneous changes of peer effect and resources. I do not 
find evidence that school desegregation affects infant health among white mothers in 
the full samples or highly desegregated sample (Table 2 and Table 3).  
Other Outcomes Chapter 2 provides a discussion on other outcomes. To summarize, I 
do not find that school desegregation affects white mother’s education at birth or 
teenage status.  
Conclusion  
	  
The paper finds that for black mothers, school desegregation improves infant 
health, as measured by preterm birth. It also increases maternal education, maternal 
age, and paternal age. These may be important pathways to improved infant health. It 
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also finds that school desegregation is associated with no effect on infant health for 
white mothers.   
A full appreciation of the effects of school desegregation is especially important as 
school districts are being released from court-mandated desegregation plans (Lutz, 
2011; Reardon et al., 2012). As a result, school districts are become substantially more 
segregated again, inducing decreases in academic performance and increases in crime 
in affected districts (Bilings et al., 2013). My paper provides a piece of important 
evidence regarding the multiplier effect of school desegregation on intergenerational 
effects. This has implications for jurists considering current challenges to race-based 
affirmative actions. If legal doctrine shifts to prohibit consideration of race in the 
development of policy it may lose some of the benefits that can be obtained through 
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Chapter Four - Intergenerational Effect of Political Influence 
 
4.1 Introduction  
There are many ways bureaucrats can improve their offspring’s labor market 
outcome. For example, bureaucrats can invest in their child’s education or health27. 
They can provide better social connections to obtain job information or letters of 
reference (Granovetter, 1983; Kramarz & Skans, 2006; Loury, 2006; Magruder, 2010). 
In addition, they can exert political influence to obtain better job opportunities for their 
offspring.  
Political influence refers to the ability to directly or indirectly convert political 
power into economic benefits. In democratic countries, political power can be 
translated into economic advantages because bureaucrats can affect the allocation of 
resources through the the design and implementation of regulation (Stigler, 1971)28. In 
return, bureaucrats can receive votes or resources by providing firms with regulatory 
favors such as subsidies or tax benefits.  
In transitional economies like China, bureaucrats have almost absolute control over 
resources at the outset of a transition to the marketplace, since “virtually all capital, real 
estate, and natural resources are initially under public ownership” (Walder 2003, pg 
901). Because of this lingering legacy of a command economy, politicians can garner 
economic benefits through their ability to acquire or sell state property through 
privatization. Thus, their offspring can also reap economic benefits directly through 
establishing their own companies or making strategic investments. For example, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See Almond & Currie (2011) and Black (2011) for literature review.  
 
28 Empirical studies range from democratic countries like the United States (Roberts, 1990) to semi-
democratic countries like Malaysia (Johnson & Mitton, 2003) to full dictatorships like the last Indonesia 
regime (Fisman, 2011) to cross country studies (Faccio, 2006; Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001)  which 
document that companies benefit from being politically connected. 
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children of Yongkang Zhou, an ex-member of China’s ruling Politburo Standing 
Committee, control 37 companies with ventures mostly in energy and related to the 
China National Petroleum Corporation, which Zhou headed in the 1990s (Forsythe et 
al., 2014).29 
In addition, because of the slow development of market-supporting institutions, 
private companies suffer from weak property protection, opaque information, and 
difficulties in obtaining bank loans (McNally, 2007; Nee, 1989; Nee, 1992; Steinfeld, 
2004). To overcome these challenges and state discrimination, private firms actively 
seek close ties with the government (Fan et al., 2008; Fang et al., 2014; Fisman & 
Wang, 2013; Kung & Ma, 2011; Li et al., 2008; Xin & Pearce,1996; Zhou, 2009; Sun 
et al., 2010). In return, bureaucrats obtain benefits such as gifts or cash or other 
activities that hover on a legal borderline such as placing children on firms’ payrolls. 
This particular practice is illustrated in an internal email written by senior banker Fang 
Fang, where he mentioned that Gao Hucheng, China’s Minister of Commerce, 
indicated that he would be “willing to go extra miles to help J.P Morgan in whatever 
way we think he can” if his son can keep his job at J.P. Morgan. This email is disclosed 
as part of an investigation into whether JPMorgan hired people so that their family 
members in government or state-owned enterprises can bring business to the firm 
(Levin et al., 2015)30. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 This information is disclosed by Chinese government as a part of anti-corruption campaign in China 
starting 2013 to the present (2015).  
 
30 The Foreign Corrupt Practice Act, a 1977 federal law, effectively bars U.S. companies from giving 
anything of value to obtain business. In recent years, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the Justice Department have deemed that a company acts with “corrupt” intent when it has the 
expectation of offering a job in exchange for government business.  
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The concept of political influence is often confounded with the concept of social 
connection. However, the mechanism at work is fundamentally different. Social 
network stems from inefficiencies in the labor market. Parental social network can help 
offspring because firms believe high-ability contacts can refer high-ability workers 
(Montgomery, 1991). Hence, employers use employee referrals from influential 
sources as a useful screening device. Thus, social network affects the probability of 
obtaining a job. Political influence stems from political economic structure as discussed 
in the last section. It can affect the probability of obtaining a job and the income level. 
It is also important to differentiate social connection from political influence because 
they lead to different policy implications. To reduce intergenerational transmission of 
opportunity, the social network story suggests that the government should consider 
encouraging the mandate of public disclosure of job openings; the political influence 
story suggests the government needs to consider ways to curb political influence.  
In addition, political influence and social connection are referred as “guan-xi,” an 
umbrella term that refers to relationship in China (Gold et al., 2004). In a very general 
sense, guanxi resembles social capital with the intention of converting itself into 
economic or political capital through a web of familial obligation and sentiments, or 
through informal ties that are strategically maintained and mobilized for instrumental 
purposes (Bian, 2002; Walder, 1986; Wank, 1999; Yang, 1994;). People use guanxi to 
solicit employment information, create application opportunities, and influence 
screening process. It has always been a persistent and significant factor in the allocation 
of jobs in urban China (Bian, 1997). Even information is not free (Ronas-tas, 1994). 
However, in China, guanxi is by no means free and expected to be reciprocal. An 
instrumental network facilitates the exchange of favors. Such favors generally take the 
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form of  money, goods, or services. Between bureaucrats and private firms, both parties 
need to offer and gain something to maintain this relationship. In this sense, political 
influence can be seen as sub-concept of “guan-xi” that plays an instrumental network 
role and takes place in the form of patron-client relations (Walder, 1986).  
This study seeks to identify the intergenerational effects of political influence by 
exploiting an exogenously imposed loss of political position. In China, male 
bureaucrats are required to retire at the age of 60. After retirement, a bureaucrat 
relinquishes his position and potentially loses political influence. To estimate the effect 
of dissolution of political influence, I compare bureaucrat offspring’s incomes before 
and after their bureaucrat fathers’ retirement. At retirement one continues to know the 
same set of friends and (former) colleagues, and constant and pre-determined 
characteristics like education and existing social ties should not change after retirement. 
Hence, the identification strategy that relies on the retirement of the father limits the 
possible mechanism to changes at retirement other than the departure from a 
bureaucratic employment post. What does change with retirement is the degree of 
political influence that is associated with an active employment position in a 
bureaucratic firm.  To control for trend, I use a difference-in-difference approach to 
compare incomes of the offspring of bureaucrats with children of non-bureaucrats 
before and after the fathers' retirement. To deal with the endogeneity of non-random 
retirement, I instrument retirement status using the binding retirement policy rule.  
However, the retirement of bureaucrat fathers may lead to differential changes to 
families that are not captured by demographic information. To address this concern, I 
exploit the variation of political influence by offspring’s gender. This allows a triple-
difference approach combined with an instrumental variable, where I compare incomes 
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of sons of bureaucrats with sons of non-bureaucrats before and after the fathers' 
retirement, using incomes of daughters of bureaucrats and daughters of non-bureaucrat 
before and after the fathers' retirement as the control group. In addition, I examine how 
the extent of opportunities for political extraction affects the coefficients associated 
with bureaucrat fathers’ retirement.  
To shed light on the time dynamics of the loss of political influence, I estimate 
difference-in-difference models and triple-difference models with nonparametric leads 
and lags for age to mandatory retirement. I utilize cross-section data from China 
Household Income Project Surveys (CHIPS). To ensure results are not driven by 
differential trends, I conduct a series of falsification tests and find that there is no trend 
break at or after retirement. In addition, the non-parametric graph suggests that there is 
no confounding pre-trend. The effect of bureaucrat retirement takes place immediately 
for a son. Retirement of a bureaucrat father translates into a decrease in offspring’s 
earnings of 13%. The triple-difference approach suggests retirement of a bureaucrat 
father translates into a decrease in offspring’s earnings of 27% for a son. Lastly, 
retirement of bureaucrat father is associated with larger income losses for offspring 
working in the same industry sector as their fathers and in industries that have high 
concentration of assets or are controlled by the state. The channel of income losses 
operates through the loss of bonus and leadership positions.  
There is a small but growing set of literature on intergenerational correlations of 
political connection. Wang (2013) finds that the death of a father-in-law reduces 
children's wage by 7% using individual fixed effects. She suggests that the income 
decline is due to nepotism, but does not focus her analysis on political influence in 
particular. Li et al. (2012) find that having a bureaucrat parent is associated with a 15% 
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wage premium in the labor market in China. Jia & Lan (2014) find that for offspring 
with parents working in governments with large economy size, they are more likely to 
become entrepreneurs and earn more from their businesses. I contribute to this 
literature by isolating the characteristics of political influence from other bureaucratic 
parental characteristics. 
This paper contributes to the measuring of a bureaucratic premium in transitional 
economies. Empirical literature has not reached a consensus on the size of the benefits 
of being a bureaucrat. Some studies have found premium (Jia and Lan 2013; Li et al. 
2012; Morduch and Sicular 2000), while others suggest that personal gain in terms of 
individual income is much smaller (Li et al. 2007; Zhang et al. 2012). Zhang et al. 
(2012) estimate the return to being bureaucrats by comparing household incomes 
before and after households become bureaucrats in rural areas. Consistent with their 
finding, I find that the returns to bureaucrat households disappear soon after the 
bureaucrat member steps down from his or her office, indicating most of the return to 
bureaucrat is attributable to the leadership position. Li et al. (2007) find that the twin 
bureaucrat and the non-bureaucrat have similar income levels and thus conclude that 
bureaucrats do not benefit from  political affiliation. However, in the past few years, 
corruption investigations have uncovered many politicians who used extended ties to 
receive benefits for their siblings and offspring. My results also suggest that it is 
important to consider the benefits of being a bureaucrat beyond one’s own income.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the quasi-
experimental approach. Section 3 discusses data. Section 4 discusses econometric 
strategies. Section 5 presents results. Section 6 provides discussion.  
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4.2 Context and Quasi-Experiment  
I focus on fathers who have political influence within an organization. I restrict my 
definition of bureaucrats to those who are directors or vice directors of a government or 
pseudo-government organizations, such as state- owned enterprises (SOE) or public 
organizations.  This is different from previous literature: Li et al. (2013), Walder 
(2002), and Zhou (2000) define bureaucrat as those holding civil service positions in 
the government or bureaucratic positions in pseudo-government organizations  
To estimate the return to having political influence, previous literature has 
regressed the dummy or binary variable of the presence of  bureaucratic parents on the 
offspring's total incomes (citation). However, this approach could be upwardly biased 
in terms of other unobserved positive characteristics.  
I adopt the timing of bureaucrat retirement to identify the dissolution of political 
influence. This convention relies on the assumption that at the time of retirement, the 
bureaucrat steps down from his positions and loses political influence. Because of the 
age-based rule, one's retirement timing is publicly known to external organizations with 
interests tied with the bureaucrat. The idea is also similar to studies that estimate the 
return to gaining of political power using regression discontuity of voting outcome 
(Fisman, 2013).   
Previous studies have exploited the sudden death of a politician (Fisman, 2011) or 
family member (Wang, 2013).With death, the loss of social network and political 
influence takes place at the same time. With mandatory retirement policy, I can limit 
the possible mechanism to changes at retirement.   
I also consider estimating the return to female’s political influence, but bureaucrat 
mothers and non-bureaucrat mothers are required to retire at a different age. Hence, 
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non-bureaucrat offspring would not be a good control group. Thus, I am limiting my 
analysis to estimating the return to father’s political influence.  
Time Trend 
Under the human capital framework, an offspring’s income is determined by his 
education, experience, social network, and other individual and family characteristics. 
It is plausible that predetermined characteristics do not change because of the father’s 
retirement. To control for trends in experience and age, I present a difference-in-
difference approach to compare incomes of children of the bureaucrats with children of 
non-bureaucrats before and after fathers’ retirement.  
Retirement Rule 
I address the possible endogeneity of retirement timing by taking advantage of the 
exogenously determined timing of retirement in the urban sector: a male must retire in 
the month of reaching 60. Retirement policy is linked with social security. If one retires 
early without special approval from the social security department, one would lose the 
entire package of social security and healthcare. Special approvals are only considered 
for people whose occupations are health damaging. Retiring beyond the mandatory age 
is not common in the government workforce either. The government has an incentive to 
alleviate the problem of unemployment by asking government-related organizations to 
absorb new workforce. Given the seniority rules, a bureaucrat near the retirement age 
receives higher pay. Hence employers do not have an incentive to prolong retirement.  
Differential Retirement Effect  
One may be concerned that retirement affects bureaucrat and non-bureaucrat 
households differently31. To address concerns of differential trends, I construct a triple 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 For example, a retired non-bureaucratic father may be more likely to help out with household chores. 
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difference32 and exploit the variation of political influence by child’s gender in 
contrasting within-gender effects to between-gender effects following Magruder (2010) 
and Duflo & Saez (2002). Daughters may serve as a control group if they experience 
similar bureaucrat retirement effects, but have lower access to fathers’ political 
influence. The latter assumption is plausible because traditionally Chinese families 
favor male offspring; in addition, sons face intensive mating competition given the 
surplus of males as compared to females (Edlund et al., 2013). They are expected to 
care for the old (Almond et al., 2013). Hence, fathers may be more willing to exert 
political influence for sons. Second, previous literature focusing on social connections 
has found gender specificity and segregation in the effect of parental social connection 
(Magruder, 2010; Wang, 2013). Wang (2013) suggests that in China, occupations are 
segregated by gender and hence fathers are more likely to be able to provide assistance 
for positions staffed by men. This effect may extend to political influence. The 
identification assumption of the empirical strategy is that parental and offspring’s 
characteristics of bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats do not change differentially before 
and after the parental mandatory retirement for son and daughter.  
However, even with triple-difference approach, I cannot completely rule out a 
competing hypothesis that the difference of a son with retired father is different from a 
daughter with retired father for bureaucrats and non- bureaucrats. As suggestive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
As a result, the offspring may spend more time at work and earn higher income. This is unlikely, since 
traditionally all parents help with the chores of their offspring. Second, retirement induces worse health 
for bureaucrats but has no impact for non-bureaucrats, so a bureaucrat child needs to spend more time 
caring for the father. However, Lei (2012) has found that retirement has induced worse health only for 
non-bureaucrats and people with lower education. This can also imply that a non-bureaucrat child has to 
work even harder to compensate for the medical bills. Shen (2014) dispels this concern using monthly 
administrative data and finds that retirement does not induce more medical expenditure. 
 
32 Preference is given for the difference-in-difference approach for the ease of interpretation and that 
father’s political influence has an effect on both genders.	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evidence, I develop crude measures to proxy for opportunities for political influence. I 
examine whether the coefficients associated with bureaucrat father’s retirement are 
larger (in absolute value) when there exists more opportunities for bureaucrats to exert 
influence. In addition, I test prediction that the channel of loss of income operates 
through loss of bonus and leadership position rather than through employment status.  
Dynamics of the loss of political influence 
The extent of loss of political influence at the time of retirement may differ depending 
on the substantiality and sustainability of bureaucratic power. For some positions, the 
transition of work status may start even before retirement. For example, one can be 
adjusted to a position of less importance and maintain the same rank or title.  
Or one may hold political influence and work till the last month prior to retirement. 
External organizations may keep favoring the income of the bureaucrat’s offspring 
after the retirement of the father, depending on the reciprocal agreements, the timing 
and, the size of the previous business exchanges. In addition, as the head of an 
organization, to avoid a significant drop of political influence, one can strategically 
appoint allies in key positions before retirement.  
To understand the dynamics of the loss of political influence, I trace out the time 
pattern of the retirement effect without putting structure on the time trend. The 
phenomenon is more prolonged and gradual than using a single retirement date to 
model it. Hence, it allows flexibility before and after the treatment. This statistical 
treatment provides insight on how and when the loss of political influence takes place. 
4.3 Data and Summary Statistics 
4.3.1 Survey Information 
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I utilize survey data from the Chinese Household Income Project (CHIPS). The 
data were collected to measure and estimate the distribution of personal income and 
related economic factors in urban areas and rural areas in China. I analyze the data 
from urban areas33. In addition, I limit my sample of study to parents who have worked 
full time in governments or companies (including private companies). Hence my 
sample does not include parents who have only worked as self-employed or 
unemployed individuals. In addition, I limit my analysis to individuals with offspring 
that are within ten years of mandatory retirement.  
The survey collects income information of working individuals in the household. I 
link individuals by family identification number. The survey does not have information 
on individuals who do not live in the household being surveyed. While many 
households live together, housing arrangements are not random. In Appendix Table 1, I 
compare the fathers’ characteristics for surveyed households with parents that live with 
or without offspring. I found that those who live with offspring are slightly younger, 
work more, and are less likely to be retired. Therefore, I could not generalize my claim 
to families with children who do not live together. In addition, my estimate will be 
biased if a bureaucrat father moves to live only with the low-performing offspring after 
retirement. I examine this problem by conducting falsification tests in the next section. 
I find convincing evidence that the choice of co-living arrangements does not differ for 
bureaucrat fathers and non-bureaucrat fathers before and after retirement. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 There are two reasons I limit my sample to urban residents. First, retirement rules only applied to 
formal sectors which are usually concentrated in non-rural locations. In addition, urban dwellers 
represent a more comparable group as compared to rural dwellers who largely work as farmers or 
migrant workers. 
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I use information from the survey waves of 1995, 1999, and 2002. In the survey, 
everyone was asked about their income34 from previous years. In the 1995 survey, 
adults were asked to report total income from 1990–1995; in the 1999 and 2002 
surveys, adults were asked to report their total income from the previous five years. I 
include this information as cross-section data. I also analyze the dataset with income 
information only from the year being surveyed. While the results are qualitatively 
similar, the latter approach gives more precision. 
Total income refers to all income received by an individual, and it includes wage, 
bonus, gifts, and asset income. Measurement errors stemming from underreporting of 
income have been a general concern for survey data in China. However, it will only 
cause problems for my estimation if a bureaucrat’s child underreports income after the 
retirement of the father. 
I construct the dummy variable of retirement by comparing the timing of the 
retirement and the timing of the survey. If the year–month pair of retirement is later 
than the year–month pair of the survey, I consider the individual as not retired. Surveys 
are conducted in the early spring of the following year so that one can have an accurate 
report of the total annual income of last year. Since it is measured as annual income, if 
the individual retired in the middle of the survey year, in my calculation, he or she is 
counted as retired. However, part of the income is actually earned before retirement of 
the father; therefore, I also calculated the results using a donut hole for difference-in-
difference by excluding observations at the threshold (Barreca et al. 2011). I find that 
my results are robust to this potential measurement problem. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 It is possible that individuals under-report their income. Offspring of bureaucrats may under-report income more 
before parental retirement. In this case, it may lead to a under-estimation of the results.  
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4.3.2 Summary Statistics  
The summary statistics are shown from appendix table 2 and table 3. Appendix 
table 4 reports summary statistics by bureaucrat and non-bureaucrat. 10% of the 
samples are bureaucrats’ offspring. On average, the annual incomes of bureaucrats’ 
children are higher than for non-bureaucrats. The average log income for offspring of a 
bureaucrat is 8.38. The average log income for offspring of non-bureaucrat is 8.32. The 
difference is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. As compared to non-
bureaucrats, bureaucrats receive 1.5 years more education and they are 50 percentage 
points more likely to be members of the Communist Party. As compared to offspring of 
non-bureaucrats, offspring of bureaucrats receive 0.5 years more education and they are 
2 percentage points more likely to be members of the Communist Party. While OLS 
can use demographic information as controls, the differences in observables caution us 
about possible omitted variable bias in the unobservables. 
4.4 Empirical Strategies 
4.4.1 Regression Specification  
	  
My first stage is to examine whether the retirement rule is binding. Previous 
literature has exploited policy on age as a first stage (Card, Dobkin, and Maestas 2004, 
2008, 2009; Chay, Kim, and Swaminathan 2011; Shigeoka 2014; Lei, 2009; Shen, 
2014).35 My basic estimation strategy for the first stage is the following: 
(1)     Y!"# = 𝑓 𝛼 + 𝛿! +   𝜃! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# + 𝛾𝑋!"# + 𝜀!!" 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 This first stage in China has been exploited by Lei et al. (2009), who used 2005 rhw one percent 
population survey and the 2002 Chinese household Income Project Survey to explore the impact of 
retirement on self-reported health and mental outcomes with a regression discontinuity design. Lei et al. 
(2009) find that the rate of retirement rises from 65% to 78% within the three months of turning 60 for 
males using the 2005 one percent survey data. In addition, Shen (2014) uses administrative social 
security data and examines the impact of retirement on health expenditure. She finds that within the 
month one turns 60, the rate of retirement increases from 10% to 48% for males. Both studies 
documented a sharp discontinuity of retirement induced by the policy.  
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where the outcome variable Y!"# is a dummy variable that equals 1 if retired or 0 
otherwise for individual i in province j and year k. 𝑓 𝛼  is a smooth function of 
father’s age that allows for different slopes at the right-hand side and left-hand side of 
the cutoff. I center it around retirement age which is 60;  𝛿! is a dummy variable for 
province j, 𝜃! is a dummy variable for a dummy variable for year k; 
𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if father is over the age of 
retirement,  𝑋!"# includes a set of demographic controls including father’s marital 
status, party status, years of schooling; offspring’s age, gender, party status, years of 
schooling, and years of schooling to the square, and 𝜀!"# is an unobserved error 
component. Again, I cluster the standard error on the individual level since an 
individual appears in my sample multiple times. My parameter of interest is 𝛽!, which 
measures the compliance rate of the age-binding retirement.  
Figure 1 presents first-stage graphs and Figure 2 presents first-stage graphs with 
controls. The diamond dots represent information for non-bureaucrats and the circle 
dots represent for bureaucrats. Table 1 and 2 present first-stage regression results 
analogous to results of Figure 1 and 2. They regress the dummy variable of passing the 
mandatory retirement age on the rate of retirement. Column 1 includes the entire 
sample. Column 2 and Column 3 report regression results for non-bureaucrats and 
bureaucrats respectively controlling only for year and province pair dummy variables. 
Both the graph and regression clearly show that mandatory retirement policy results in 
a statistically significant increase in the probability of retirement. Table 3 is similar but 
restricts the sample to offspring that report income. After ensuring that the retirement 
rule is binding, I run the following specification that combines IV and difference in 
difference.  
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(2) Y!"# = 𝛼 + 𝛿! + 𝛾! + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# ∗ 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡!"# + 𝛽! ∗ 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡!"# + 𝛽! ∗
𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# + 𝑋!"# + 𝜖!"# 
where Y!"# is the log of total income of an individual in province j year k; 𝛿! is a 
province fixed effect; 𝛾!is a year fix effect; 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# is a dummy variable that 
equals 0 if the father has retired and 1 if the father has not retired; 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡!"# is a 
dummy variable equals 0 if the father is a bureaucrat and 1 if the father is not a 
bureaucrat; 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# ∗ 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡!!" is an interaction term of the dummy 
variable retirement and a dummy variable of being a bureaucrat; 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# is 
instrumented by𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"#. In addition, 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# ∗ 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡!"# is 
instrumented by an interaction term of r𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# ∗ 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!"#. Thus 𝛽! 
measures the association of being a retired bureaucrat on total income. I cluster the 
standard error on the individual.  
I also estimate difference-in-difference non-parametrically using Eq. (3).  
(3)     y!"# = 𝛼 + 𝛿! + 𝛾! + 𝛽!!!!!!!! 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡!"#𝐼!" + 𝐼!" + 𝑏𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑡!"# + 𝑋!"# + 𝜖!"#𝛼 + 𝜀! 
where 𝐼!" is a set of dummy variables and equals 1 when the individual i is p years 
away from retirement. 𝛽! measure the difference in incomes of offsprings between 
bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats as compared to the omitted group. In this case, the 
omitted group is −1 years to retirement. This time sequence allows me to statistically 
and graphically examine the difference in incomes at every point in time. Again, I 
cluster the standard error on the individual level.  
In order to summarize these estimates, I estimate regression by including a linear 
term for age to mandatory retirement, a bureaucrat dummy variable which equals one 
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or zero, and an interaction between a bureaucrat dummy variable and age to mandatory 
retirement age. This model is a form of equation (3) in which I constraint the relative 
pre-and post-retirement trends to be linear.  
I also estimate a triple-difference by adding interaction of every term with gender. I 
also construct a triple difference non-parametrically in a similar way.  
4.4.2 Identification Assumption 
	  
I check whether retirement affects housing arrangements differently by fitting Eq. 
(3). The result is presented in appendix table 5. I find that being retired and a 
bureaucrat is not statistically significantly associated with the probability of being in 
the same household with the offspring. This provides evidence that the choice of co-
living arrangements is not differential for bureaucrat fathers and non-bureaucrat fathers 
before and after retirement.  
Second, I check for trend breaks of father and offspring’s demographic 
characteristics by fitting the same model using the difference-in-difference method 
following Eq. (3). The results for Eq. (3) are shown in Appendix table 4 and Appendix 
table 5. All but 1 of the 14 estimates is insignificant in the sample at the 5 percent level. 
The education level is lower for bureaucrat leaders considered after the retirement. 
However, since I am testing 14 control variables, it may happen by chance that one of 
them is rejected at the 5 percent significance level. In addition, I check for trend breaks 
using the triple-difference method. The results are shown in appendix table 6 and 
appendix table 7. None of the 13 estimates are statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level (excluding offspring gender).  
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All regressions are weighted by the number of observation per individual provided 
because I am using individual’s income information multiple times as cross section 
data.  
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Non-Parametric Results 
	  
I begin by presenting a series of figures that provide a visual description of our results. 
Figure 3 depicts the estimates of 𝛽! from the non-parametric difference-in-difference 
approach. The x-axis describes the years to mandatory retirement age; the y-axis 
describes the log of incomes. Each point represents the estimate of 𝛽! at p years to 
mandatory retirement age, with the height of the bars extending from each point 
representing the bounds of the 95% confidence interval (CI) calculated from the 
standard errors. 𝛽! refer to the difference in incomes in log between offspring of 
bureaucrat and non-bureaucrat relative to year negative one to mandatory retirement. 
Year negative one is imposed as a zero. Full regression estimates for figure 3 and 4 are 
reported in column 2 of table 4 and 5.  
Figure 3 provides suggestive evidence that, before retirement, the incomes of the 
offspring of the bureaucrats are higher than those of non-bureaucrats. It shows that pre-
trends are relatively stable. However, after retirement, compared to year -1, the 
difference between incomes of the offspring of the bureaucrats and non-bureaucrats 
becomes smaller. Further, the difference continues to narrow over time.  
Figure 4 provides non-parametric graph for triple-difference. Each point represents 
the estimate of 𝛽!, which is a coefficient identified from the bureaucrat year to 
mandatory retirement age for sons versus daughters. The qualitative results are similar 
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to Figure 3. In addition, I find that loss of incomes takes place immediately after 
fathers’ retirement.  
4.5.3 Regression Results  
	  
Table 7 and table 8 present corresponding regression results to Figure 3 and 4. For 
table 7, the main coefficient of interest is the interaction term of having father who is a 
bureaucrat and retired. For table 9, the main coefficient of interest is the interaction 
term of son and having father being a bureaucrat and retired.   
Column 1 includes year-province dummy variables; Column 2 includes year-
province dummy variables and years of education; Column 3 includes year-province 
dummy variables and all demographic controls; Column 4 is similar to Column 3 but 
does not include the year of retirement. Column 3 is the preferred specification.   
Regression results in table 7 show that an offspring with a father as a retired bureaucrat 
leader is associated with a 13.4% loss of income. The coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. Reduced form estimates are reported in table 8. Regression 
results in table 9 suggest that having a father who is a retired bureaucrat leader is 
associated with a 27.4% loss of son’s income. The result is consistent with previous 
empirical evidence that the father plays a stronger role in determining the son’s labor 
market outcome (Magruder, 2010; Wang, 2013).  
I also separate offspring into sons and daughters and ask how each of these groups 
seems to be affected by father’s retirement. Column 1 and 2 in table 10 provide results 
corresponding to my triple-difference result.   
4.5.4 More Access and Opportunities for Political Influence   
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I explore the hypothesis that given a policy and regulatory environment, bureaucrats 
extract more when they have more access and opportunities to have an influence on 
their child’s success. First, it is intuitive that bureaucrats can exert more political 
influence when their children work in the same sectors as they do. Hence, I present 
subgroup analysis for offspring that work in the same sectors as their parents36. 
Consistent with prediction, column 4 in table 10 suggests that children who work in the 
same industries as their parents are affected more by bureaucrat fathers’ retirement. 
Having a retired bureaucrat father working in the same industry is associated with a 
decrease of 26% in income and is statistically significant. However, it is unclear 
whether political influence is only constrained within parent-child pair industry, or due 
to selection bias: people who can exert political influence would direct their offspring 
to work in the same industry. Unfortunately I cannot test this empirically with the 
current research design.  
Second, Walder (2003) suggests that high asset concentration as opposed to 
dispersed assets offers more opportunities for extraction. In addition, bureaucrats can 
exert more influence when the government or state-own enterprises play a dominant 
role in the industry. Based on these two predictions, I construct a crude dummy 
variable for sectors that reflect these differences37. Column 4 in table 10 suggests that 
having a retired bureaucrat father working in a high asset concentration or state 
dominated sector is associated with a decrease in income of 23% and is statistically 
significant.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  There are 14 job sectors defined in the survey: agriculture, light or heavy industry, mining, 
construction, transport, commerce, real estate, health, education, culture, science, finance, government or 
party, others, and unknown. 
 
37 The following industries are considered to yield more opportunities for bureaucrats  
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Third, I examine offspring working in private firms (including self-employed) and 
foreign firms to see which are more affected by bureaucrat fathers’ retirement. Column 
4 in table 10 suggests that children who work in private firms are more affected by 
bureaucrat fathers’ retirement. However, this is not statistically significantly different 
from zero.  
Overall, this section finds that the effect of bureaucrat retirement in the labor market 
is consistent with the predictions that bureaucrats extract more when they have more 
access and opportunities. 
4.5.5 The Channel of Income Loss  
	  
I expect that the effect of benefits from political influence should be subtle and 
secretive, while taking away of benefits should be non-intrusive. Hence, the changes 
from father’s retirement would most likely to take in place in losses of bonuses or other 
income rather than a decrease in unemployment or changes of industry and sectors.  
To shed light on the channels of income loss, I explore other labor market 
outcomes that can be potentially affected by the retirement of bureaucrat father. More 
specifically, I explore whether the loss of political influence affects unemployment 
rate,38 chances of being promoted to leadership positions,39 income from bonuses, and 
income from other sources. In addition, as a falsification test, I examine whether 
bureaucrat retirement is associated with offspring’s probability of being in the same 
industry as the parent and being in private or foreign firms (including self-employed).  
Table 11 presents corresponding results. The number of observations is much 
smaller than the main outcome of total income. The survey asks for the last 5–6 years 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Unemployment refers to people who explicitly state that they are unemployed and looking for jobs. 
This excludes people who are still in school or are homemakers. 
 
39 Being in a leadership position refers to holding any kind of rank or leadership position. 
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of information on total income but asks for only one year of information on other 
outcomes. Second, for private business owners, the concept of leadership position and 
bonus does not apply to them. 
Consistent with my hypothesis, I do not find bureaucrat retirement leads to 
offspring changing industry or firm sector changes or unemployment. In addition, I 
find that a retired bureaucrat’s offspring is less likely to be in a leadership position by 
16.2% and receives fewer bonuses. However, this result is not statistically significant. 
It is noisily estimated because of the lack of data; nevertheless, it provides some 
intuitive results.  
4.6 Discussion  
Despite the rich anecdotes and on-going law-ordered investigation of the 
intergenerational benefits of political influence, it has been difficult to empirically 
disentangle political influence from parental social network and other parental 
characteristics. To my knowledge, this is the first paper providing causal estimates of 
the intergenerational effect of political influence. I find that the wage premium of 
having a bureaucrat parent is around 13%. The wage premium may be as high as 27% 
for sons. The loss of income is larger for offspring in the same industry with the father 
and offspring with father working in a state dominated sector. Point estimates suggest 
that the source of wage premium comes from being less likely to be in a leadership 
position and receiving bonuses, though this is noisily estimated. There are reasons to 
believe that this estimation is attenuated. Retired parents can be hired in private sectors 
or advise the government informally. Families of politicians are also more likely to 
work in government. Even if a parent retires, a close relative’s political influence can 
serve as a substitute.  
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On a broader level, the attempt to get a causal estimate of intergenerational effect of 
political influence is loosely related to the literature on the measurement of bribery, 
defined as the wedge between the actual and privately appropriated marginal product of 
capital (Svensson 2005). Because of the secrecy of bribery, researchers have previously 
relied on national subjective assessment of corruption40 or empirically estimated41 
measures of aggregated level. There has been a small but growing set of literature 
measuring bribery on the individual level: Duggan and Levitt (2002) on Japanese sumo 
wrestlers, Fisman et al. (2014) on Indian bureaucrats, and Fang et al. (2014) on Chinese 
bureaucrats on the housing market. By focusing on offspring’s labor market outcome, I 
provide an estimation of bribery on the individual level that is especially hard to 
identify because it hovers on a legal borderline. However, it is important to note that 
even if this can be called bribery, it is not necessarily equivalent to its legal term 
definition. The political influence could come willingly or unwillingly, intentionally or 
un-intentionally. It can bring benefits in such a subtle way that it was not even noticed 
by the offspring or the parents.  
Among common young people, there have been heated discussions and aroused 
anger against the social or economic privileges enjoyed by children of bureaucrats (Li 
et al., 2011; Yuan & Chen, 2013). My paper confirms the economic privilege enjoyed 
by bureaucrats, but it also finds that the gap in incomes between bureaucrat and non-
bureaucrat closes after the retirement of the father. Consistent with Zhang et al. (2012), 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  See Rose-Ackerman (2004) for a literature review on the importance of having an objective 
measurement of corruption and the limitation of an aggregated measurement of corruption. 
 
41 For the recent literature that measures corruption objectively: Duggan and Levitt (2002), Olken (2006, 
2007), Reinikka and Svensson (2004), Svensson (2003), Tella and Schargrodsky (2003). Objective 
measurement of corruption in China: Cai et al. (2011), Fisman and Wang (2013), Lan and Li (2014).  
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the advantages established through political leadership do not seem to lead to a 
persistent return after leaving the position.  
Recent exposure and corruption charges of bureaucrats in China may have 
successfully reduced corruption, social dissatisfaction towards economic and social 
privilege, and perhaps even intergenerational transmission of political influence. The 
finding of an income gap prior to parental retirement suggests that government should 
consider providing continued support in terms of career for young workers to increase 
their value add. An optimistic interpretation for public policy is that the government 
can assist young workers who lack political advantages until the mid-thirties when they 
are on a more equal footing with their privileged peers. However, this paper is limited 
in providing evidence only on the effect of political influence on labor market. It is 
important to note that benefits from political influence may have started earlier on from 
the choice of education, marriage market, and housing. Hence, this limitation calls for 
future research to identify the intergenerational effect of political influence beyond 
labor market. 
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Chapter Five: Future Research  
 
My dissertation attempts to understand how parents affect the outcomes of 
children. The evidences are presented in the context of China and the United States. I 
have made contribution to the field of intergenerational mobility by isolating single 
parental characteristic from other confounding factors.  
Chapter two and three provide important evidences of how school desegregation 
generates social benefits beyond standard classroom through demographic change and 
infant health improvement. There is a long history of racial inequality between blacks 
and whites in the United States. Schools were, pre-1954, explicitly and completely 
separated by race in the Southern and Border States. In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled 
that separate schools for blacks and whites were “inherently unequal.'' This paper 
assesses the effects of school desegregation. I exploit county- and cohort-level 
variation, taking advantage of the difference in the timing of school desegregation 
implementation across counties. Using individual-level birth certificate data, I find 
strong evidence that school desegregation increases biracial births, a measure of racial 
relationships. In addition, among black mothers, school desegregation improves infant 
health; it also increases parental education and decreases teenage births. These may be 
important pathways to improved infant health. The results are robust to controls for 
state- and region-specific time trends. This paper contributes to the understanding of 
the determinants of racial relationships and the long-run benefits of school 
desegregation.  
To understand the policy implication of chapter two and chapter two, it is 
important to discuss school segregation under the current political and legal framework. 
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Wells (2014) has provided a well-written argument for expansion of race-based policy 
under this framework. To give context, I first summarize her arguments.  
First, she points out that school districts are become substantially more 
segregated again as the schools are phasing out of court orders. Legally, the court is 
making it increasingly difficult for district to consider race/ethnic identity of individual 
students in making school assignment. Instead, the court argued that racial balancing is 
permissible only when districts seeks educational benefits, including “promoting cross-
racial understanding, breaking down stereotypes, fostering livelier and better informed 
class discussions, and preparing students to succeed in an increasingly diverse society”. 
In addition, it is not only important to determine that diversity would produce these 
benefits, but it is also important to determine that these benefits were critical to the 
school’s educational mission.  
Amy (2014) argues that when education and housing policies do not actively 
attempt to balance communities, schools, and students by race, they lead to more 
segregation and inequality because in the “real world” Justice Kennedy alludes to, 
people are anything but colorblind. The current education policies favor the 
accountability plans and school choice reforms, which in comparison have gained 
broad-based bipartisan support. However, in her words, Amy (2014) argues that “even 
when education policies are “colorblind” on the surface, they interact with school 
systems and residential patterns in which race is a central factor in deciding where 
students go to school, what resources and curricula they have access to, whether they 
are understood and appreciated by their teachers and classmates, and they are 
categorized across academic programs”. Thus, Amy (2014) points out that these 
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reforms without taking race into account have relatively little success in promoting 
race.  
In summary, Amy (2014) argues that it is difficult to have school desegregation 
plan now because of the political resistance. However, it remains relevant and 
important in closing racial gaps because there is always segregation and race is always 
correlated with inequality.  Thus, under this context, I believe it is even more important 
to provide an evaluation of the long-run benefits of school desegregation. By providing 
empirical results for on the multiplier effects of school desegregation, this paper 
presents benefits that have been unaccounted for in conventional cost-benefit 
calculations. This can be useful in legal-hearings for arguments regarding raced-based 
policies. In addition, it can also be useful for comparisons of race-based plans versus 
race-blind policies. Even if education policy is successful in increasing students’ 
academic performance, we would always be interested in understanding the long-run 
life outcomes of school desegregation. We not only should ask: whether the race-blind 
policy can generate the same amount of the benefits in terms of education, but we 
should also ask what is its possible impact on students’ long-run outcomes?  
One concern is whether school desegregation is cost-effective, as it involved 
significant commitment not only by the school administrators, but also black students 
who often bear the burden of being bussed long distance to attend schools. My paper 
finds that it accounts for 1/3 to 1/2 of the growths in biracial births. Second, it increases 
11% of the mother’s education by one year. As discussed closely in the result section 
of chapter two, I am measuring intention to treat effect, and there are strong reasons to 
believe that my results are attenuated.  
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Despite its benefits, even without legal barrier, it is difficult to desegregate 
schools now, because much of the racial segregation and inequality occurs between 
school districts and not within them, making possible solutions to these problems 
limited. Wells (2014) has proposed several options that would desegregate the 
neighborhoods and the school. More specifically, she mentioned programs like 
“Moving to Opportunity” or court-ordered housing integration pans in places such as 
Westchester County, NY. These efforts can and should be improved and expanded. In 
addition, policy can provide strict guideline and incentives to support and sustain 
diverse districts and communities in conjunction with fair housing policies.  
I plan to continue to work in the literature on segregation. First, because of the 
endogenous migration by white families, my causal evidence is limited to black 
mothers. Thus, for future research, I hope to learn more about the effect of school 
desegregation on private sectors, including the private market responses of building or 
expanding enrollment of private schools to cater the demand of white flight. In 
addition, I hope to adopt other measurements of social interaction. Biracial birth can be 
an extreme measure of interracial relationships. Friendship and dating information 
would help shed light on more moderate level of social interaction. Third, I hope to 
learn more about the outcomes of biracial children. What kind of schools do they 
usually attend? Do they contribute to a more understanding and less discrimination? 
How do they cope with their identity? Lastly, I plan to conduct research to learn more 
about the effects of re-segregation in the recent decades.  
While schools have segregated in the recent decades, it is important to 
understand the benefits of school desegregation. I will end the discussion on chapter 
two and three using a quote from Wells (2008 pg 85): "Racial inequality and 
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segregation did not begin in the public schools; thus we should not expect remedies in 
the public schools to solve the problem by themselves. But we can rely on racially 
diverse public schools--to the extent that current and future policies allow them to 
exist--to be critical sites in the struggle for a more just society".  
Chapter four provides rigorous evidence on the effect of parental political 
influence on offspring’s labor market. My empirical strategy identifies the dissolution 
of political influence by exploiting an age-based mandatory retirement rule in China. I 
present a difference-in-difference approach that exploits the variation of political 
influence in three dimensions: bureaucrat status, retirement status instrumented by 
retirement policy, and offspring gender. Using cross-section data from China 
Household Income Survey, I find the retirement of a bureaucrat translates into a 
decrease in offspring’s income of 13 percent. I contribute to literature by isolating the 
characteristics of political influence from other bureaucratic parental characteristics 
like social network.    
The paper suffers from the limitation of using cross-section data; panel data 
with individual fixed effect can provide a more precise estimate. In addition, it is 
important to note that benefits from political influence may have started earlier on from 
the choice of education, marriage market, and housing. Hence, this calls for future 
research to identify the intergenerational effect of political influence beyond labor 
market.  
Lastly, The paper is limited in that the data does not specify the size of the 
organization or the actual rank of the bureaucrat. I suspect that the industry, the type of 
the organization, and the rank of the bureaucrat may matter more than the size of the 
organization. I have found that the return for bureaucrat is higher in industries with 
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high asset concentration as opposed to dispersed assets offers more opportunities for 
extraction. While the official denotes a rank, the actual power of the rank varies by the 
types of the organization and the location. Hence it is difficult to construct such index. I 
expect that with greater political power, the higher the return for the family. However, 
with greater political power, one is also likely to have more extensive ties after 
retirement. Hence, I may not be able to capture the differential effect using the current 
empirical strategy.  
When I started working on chapter 3 in 2011, corruption is a rather sensitive 
and taboo topic. President Xi Jiping assumed office in late 2012 and started his 
campaign against corruption n 2013. Since then, many major figures, including the Liu 
Zhijun, the head of the railway; Zhou Yongkang, ta member of the 17th Politburo 
Standing Committee; are investigated and sentenced. Non-top level figures have also 
been investigated and tried. The number of investigations increased by around 30% to 
182,000 in just one year. The corruption did not stop for bureaucrat officials; it also 
extended to people working in the business and financial sectors starting in 2015. 
Major websites have created sections focused on corruptions and listed out the names 
and the titles of the officials being investigated everyday. According to Harvard 
Sinologist and Political Scientist Anthony Saich, “This is the most ambitious anti-
corruption campaign since at least Mao’s days” (Oster, 2014).  
Even though there are continuous doubts on whether the intention of campaign 
is to root out political enemies or to root out corruption, the extent and the length of 
corruption investigations have profound impact on the political and economic 
institutions in China. How does this trend affect the analysis of this paper? Does it root 
out intergenerational benefits for bureaucrats? Here I will provide some speculative 
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thoughts that are motivated by theoretical discussions on political structure, but not 
necessarily grounded by empirical work.  
My answer is unclear. The corruption campaign highlighted and targeted the 
cases of official’s families enjoying benefits from private companies. It uncovered 
cases of how people used extensive ties and elaborate schemes. However, without the 
change of power structure, more subtle exchanges of benefits at the micro-level can 
continue after the wind-down of the corruption campaign.  
A caveat of the paper is that it used data from 1990s to 2002. Even though 
CHIPS collected data after 2002, I have not used the latest data because they stopped 
asking individuals’ prior income.  Do I speculate the benefits would become larger 
from 2002 to 2012? Because of the increasing wealth and opportunities in the 2000s, 
political influence may be larger, and thus family benefits may be larger. Even though 
the wealth and purchase are more ostentatiously displayed in the 2000s through 
internet, political structure has not changed in these two decades. Even at the onset of 
communist regimes in Russia and China, communist party officials and their families 
have always enjoyed benefits derived from power. While we observe wealth in mid-
2000s, the pie on the purchase of land, the railway plan, the setup of private banks can 
be split in 1990s and early 2000s.  
In my empirical strategy, I calculate the difference of offspring’s income before 
and after one’s retirement. It is possible that power become more embedded and 
entrenched. Thus, even if one retires from the official position, one is less likely to lose 
all political influence. For example, there are more opportunities in the business 
sectors. Thus, one can continue to serve as a middleman between the business sectors 
after he retires. Hence, it is difficult to speculate about the actual trends of family 
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benefits and what I would find using the same empirical strategy for data in the middle 
of 2000s.  
For future research, I am interested in asking questions on whether a communist 
regime with capitalist market can have sustainable long-term economic growth. I 
believe the literature has evolved from debating whether bureaucrats have side-benefits 
to quantifying the benefits. However, the fundamental question remains to be 
unanswered. Would bureaucrats work more efficiently because they have incentive to 
earn side-money? Or do they become less productive because they would choose to 
work with inefficient firms? Does benefits derived from political influence serve as 
“grease oil” to increase efficiency through an increase of trust and decrease of 
information asymmetry? Or does it distort incentive, decrease competition, misallocate 
resources, and finally undermine productivity? Finally, does political influence 
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Figure 1.2: Black Mothers: Biracial Births 1st Birth 
	  
 
Notes: Y-axis denotes the percentage of biracial births by black mothers; X-axis denotes the number of 
years exposed to school desegregation. Panel 1 to 3 present coefficients and 95% confidence intervals 
estimated from equation 1. Panel 1 does not include any control. Panel 2 includes county fixed effect; 
Panel 3 includes county fixed effect and cohort fixed effect. The sample includes first birth by black 
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Figure 1.3: Black Mothers: Biracial Births 1st Birth Non-South 
 
 
Notes: Y-axis denotes the percentage of biracial births by black mothers; X-axis denotes the number of 
years exposed to school desegregation. Panel 1 to 3 present coefficients and 95% confidence intervals 
estimated from equation 1. Panel 1 does not include any control. Panel 2 includes county fixed effect; 
Panel 3 includes county fixed effect and cohort fixed effect. The sample includes first birth by black 
mothers who were exposed to -9 to 12 years of treatment in the non-southern counties. Standard error is 
clustered at the county level. 
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Figure 3.1: Compliance Rate of Retirement Policy  
 
 
Notes: Y-axis describes the probability of retirement. X-axis describes the year to mandatory retirement. 
Every dot represents the probability of retirement at the years to mandatory retirement. The diamond 
dots represent information for non-bureaucrats. The circle dots represent information for bureaucrats. 
The lines are connected using option in Lowess option in Stata. It represents the residual information 
after controlling for province and year fixed effect. The sample includes offspring who have reported 
income and parents who are between 50 years old to 70 years old. Standard errors are clustered by the 
year to retirement age to allow for intra-age correlation. 
 
Figure 3.2: Compliance Rate of Retirement Policy Residual 
 
 
Notes: Y-axis describes the probability of retirement. X-axis describes the year to retirement age. Every 
dot represents the probability of retirement at the years to mandatory retirement, controlling for 
province-year fixed effect. The diamond dots represent information for non-bureaucrats. The circle dots 
represent information for bureaucrats. The lines are connected using option in Lowess option in Stata. 
The sample includes offspring who have reported income and parents who are between 50 years old to 
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Figure 3.3: Nonparametric Graph Difference-in-Differences 
 
 
Notes: The x-axis describes the years to mandatory retirement age; the y-axis describes the log of income. 
Each point represents the estimate of betas from equation 2, with the height of the bars extending from 
each point represent the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from the standard errors. Each 
point refers to the difference of income in log between offspring of bureaucrat and non-bureaucrat 
relative to year -1 to retirement. I include a zero for the point estimate in relative year j=-1, but lack of 
standard error bars reflect that this zero is imposed rather than estimated. The sample includes offspring 
who have reported income and parents who are between 50 years old to 70 years old. The regression 
included all controls. Standard errors are clustered by individual. 
Figure 3.4: Nonparametric Graph Triple-Differences 
 
 
Notes: The x-axis describes the years to mandatory retirement age; the y-axis describes the log of income. 
Each point represents the estimate of betas from equation 2, with the height of the bars extending from 
each point represent the bounds of the 95% confidence interval calculated from the standard errors. Each 
point refers to the difference of income in log between offspring of bureaucrat and non-bureaucrat 
relative to year -1 to retirement. I include a zero for the point estimate in relative year j=-1, but lack of 
standard error bars reflect that this zero is imposed rather than estimated. The sample includes offspring 
who have reported income and parents who are between 50 years old to 70 years old. The regression 
included all controls. Standard errors are clustered by individual. 









All 1st Balance All Balance 1st 
Low Birthweight 0.142 0.129 0.143 0.123 
Premature Birth 0.185 0.164 0.186 0.156 
Father Race Unreport 0.339 0.381 0.292 0.294 
Father Age Unreport 0.388 0.443 0.368 0.373 
Mother Education 
Unreport 0.079 0.084 0.055 0.058 
Mother Education 12.116 11.966 12.072 12.204 
Father Education 12.355 12.430 12.296 12.400 
Mother Age 24.450 20.956 22.850 20.820 
Teenage Mother 0.224 0.489 0.235 0.458 
Teenage Father 0.080 0.208 0.092 0.192 
Married 0.357 0.266 0.261 0.219 
Prenatal Care 0.604 0.597 0.630 0.651 
First Child 0.289 
 
0.289 
 Parity 2.752 
 
2.644 




All 1st Balance All Balance 1st 
Low Birthweight 0.061 0.061 0.059 0.057 
Premature Birth 0.087 0.083 0.085 0.080 
Father Race Unreport 0.070 0.090 0.078 0.091 
Father Age Unreport 0.078 0.103 0.094 0.111 
Mother Education 
Unreport 0.151 0.157 0.170 0.175 
Mother Education 13.032 13.114 12.668 12.940 
Father Education 13.179 13.257 12.843 13.063 
Mother Age 26.738 24.447 24.437 23.300 
Teenage Mother 0.096 0.199 0.118 0.207 
Teenage Father 0.032 0.072 0.038 0.070 
Married 0.848 0.818 0.806 0.790 
Prenatal Care 0.809 0.804 0.797 0.800 
First Child 0.358 
 
0.408 
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All 1st Balance All Balance 1st 
1961 55090 10780 
  1965 1148 290 
  1966 23300 6661 
  1968 6879 1898 
  1969 139190 37863 
  1970 454110 131977 
  1971 316911 96387 
  1972 58323 17489 
  1973 340034 91231 
  1974 62898 18257 
  1975 253496 70521 130233 39146 
1976 112627 32844 57889 17347 
1977 82801 26321 43952 14118 
1978 272411 73735 143377 39070 
1979 155890 45487 79702 23391 
1980 185409 59389 91334 27903 
1981 14591 5008 7781 2702 
1982 507033 154137 262926 72864 





All 1st Balance All Balance 1st 
1961 41019 13363 
  1965 14666 4422 
  1966 126597 43913 
  1968 146290 43948 
  1969 431138 141548 
  1970 1068339 375480 
  1971 760866 277704 
  1972 226353 82747 
  1973 640680 229070 
  1974 569867 207982 
  1975 397285 139119 203096 80964 
1976 601087 221327 298446 124997 
1977 458977 169376 217584 89763 
1978 817535 282084 402639 154626 
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1979 430122 158123 207886 84628 
1980 660161 243350 301166 127912 
1981 188869 73246 93649 39660 
1982 584102 219731 259558 107711 
Total 8163953 2926533 1984024 810261 
 
TABLE 1.3 EXPOSURE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ON BIRACIAL BIRTHS BY YEAR 
 
Notes: This table is estimated using the equation 1.  Column 1 presents results estimated without any 
control. Column 2 presents results estimated using county fixed effect. Column 3 to 5 present results 
estimated using county fixed effect and cohort fixed effect. Column 4 is limited to non-southern samples. 
Column 5 is limited to southern samples. The sample includes first birth by black mothers who were 
exposed to -9 to 12 years of treatment. Standard error is clustered at the county level. 
 





TABLE 1.4 YEARS OF EXPOSURE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ON BIRACIAL BIRTHS 
 
Notes: Length of Exposure equals to 0 if the mother is not exposed to treatment; it equals to the years of 
exposure to treatment for treatment years equal or fewer than 7 years; it equals to 7 if the years of 
exposure to treatment is greater than 7 years. Column 1 presents results estimated without any control. 
Column 2 presents results estimated using county fixed effect. Column 3 to 5 present results estimated 
using county fixed effect and cohort fixed effect. Column 4 is limited to non-southern samples. Column 
5 is limited to southern samples. The sample includes first birth by black mothers who were exposed to -
9 to 12 years of treatment. Standard error is clustered at the county level. 
 
TABLE 1.5 EXPOSURE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ON FERTILITY AND FAMILY 
DECISIONS I 
 
Notes: Exposure to Desegregation equals one if the mother is ever exposed to desegregation, and zero 
otherwise. All columns include county fixed effect and cohort fixed effect. Column 1 to 3 present results 
on mother's education at the time of birth. Column 4 to 6 present results on teenage moms. Column 2 and 
4 are limited to non-southern samples. Column 3 and 5 are limited to southern samples. The sample 
includes first birth by black mothers who were exposed to -9 to 12 years of treatment. Standard error is 
clustered at the county level. 
 
TABLE 1.6 EXPOSURE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ON FERTILITY AND FAMILY 
DECISIONS II 
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Notes: Exposure to Desegregation equals one if the mother is ever exposed to desegregation, and zero 
otherwise. All columns include county fixed effect and cohort fixed effect. The sample includes first 
birth by black mothers who were exposed to -9 to 12 years of treatment. Standard error is clustered at the 
county level. 
 
TABLE 2.1 EXPOSURE TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION ON INFANT HEALTH 
 
Notes: Exposure to Desegregation equals one if the mother is ever exposed to desegregation, and zero 
otherwise. All columns include county fixed effect and cohort fixed effect. Column 1 to 3 present results 
on premature birth (defined as less than 37 week of gestational age). Column 4 to 6 present results on 
low birth weight (defined as less than 37 week of gestational age). Column 2 and 4 are limited to non-
southern samples. Column 3 and 5 are limited to southern samples. The sample includes first birth by 
black mothers who were exposed to -9 to 12 years of treatment. Standard error is clustered at the county 
level. 
 
TABLE 3.1 FIRST STAGE RESULTS  
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level. All results are based on equation (1) 
specifications, where the key independent variable is a mandatory retirement age dummy. The sample 
includes offspring who have reported income and parents whose are between 50 years old to 70 years old. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
TABLE 3.2 FIRST STAGE RESULTS: ADDING ALL DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS  
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Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level and include province-year fix effect as well as 
all demographic control. All results are based on equation (1) specifications, where the key independent 
variable is a mandatory retirement age dummy. The sample includes offspring whose parents who are 
between 50 years old to 70 years old. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
TABLE 3.3 FIRST STAGE RESULTS: ADDING ALL DEMOGRAPHIC CONTROLS AND 
RESTRICT TO OFFSPRING THAT REPORTS INCOME ONLY 
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level and include province-year fix effect as well as 
all demographic control. All results are based on equation (1) specifications, where the key independent 
variable is a mandatory retirement age dummy. The sample includes offspring who have reported income 
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TABLE 3.4 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES NON-PARAMETRIC RESULTS  
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level and include province-year fix effect and all 
demographic control. The dependent variable is the log of total income. Col (2) is estimated using 
Equation (2). The key independent variable is an interaction term between a bureaucrat dummy and 
years to mandatory retirement. Col (2) is estimated using Equation (2). The key independent variable is 
an interaction term between a bureaucrat dummy and a set of years to mandatory retirement age dummy. 
The omitted group is year -1. The sample includes offspring who have reported income and parents who 









TABLE 3.5 TRIPLE-DIFFERENCES NON-PARAMETRIC RESULTS  
 
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level and include province-year fix effect and all 
demo- graphic control. The dependent variable is the log of total income. Col (1) is estimated using a 
linear term for relative mandatory retirement age. The key independent variable is an interaction term 
between being a son and a bureaucrat dummy and years to mandatory retirement. Col (2) is estimated 
using a variation of Equation (3). The key independent variable is an interaction term between being a 
son and a bureaucrat dummy and a set of years to mandatory retirement age dummy. The omitted group 
is year -1. The sample includes offspring who have reported income and parents who are between 50 
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TABLE 3.7 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES REGRESSION RESULTS  
 
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level and include province-year fix effect. It is 
estimated using Equation (2). The dependent variable is the log of total income. The key independent 
variable is an interaction term of a bureaucrat dummy and retirement dummy. It is being instrumented by 
the interaction term of a bureaucrat dummy and the mandatory retirement dummy. Col (1) is estimated 
using province-year fixed effect; Col (2) is estimated using province-year fixed effect and offspring’s 
years of education; Col (3) is estimated using province- year fixed effect and all demographic controls 
for parents and offspring; Col (4) is estimated similarly as Col (3), but excludes the observation at the 
year of mandatory retirement. The sample includes offspring who have reported income and parents who 
are between 50 years old to 70 years old. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
TABLE 3.8 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES REDUCED FORM RESULTS  
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Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level and include province-year fix effect. It is 
estimated using Equation (3). The dependent variable is the log of total income. The dependent variable 
is the log of total income. The key independent variable is an interaction term of a bureaucrat dummy 
and mandatory retirement dummy. Col (1) is estimated using province-year fixed effect; Col (2) is 
estimated using province-year fixed effect and offspring’s years of education; Col (3) is estimated using 
province-year fixed effect and all demographic controls for parents and offspring; Col (4) is estimated 
similarly as Col (3), but excludes the observation at the year of mandatory retirement. The sample 
includes offspring who have reported income and parents who are between 50 years old to 70 years old. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
TABLE 3.9 TRIPLE-DIFFERENCES 
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level and include province-year fix effect. It is 
estimated using a variation of Equation (2). The dependent variable is the log of total income. The key 
independent variable is an interaction term of being a son and a bureaucrat dummy and mandatory 
retirement dummy. Col (1) is estimated using province-year fixed effect; Col (2) is estimated using 
province-year fixed effect and offspring’s years of education; Col (3) is estimated using province-year 
fixed effect and all demographic controls for parents and offspring; Col (4) is estimated similarly as Col 
(3), but excludes the observation at the year of mandatory retirement. The sample includes offspring who 
have reported income and parents who are between 50 years old to 70 years old. Standard errors are in 
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TABLE 3.10 EXTENSION ANALYSIS 
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level and include province-year fix effect. It is 
estimated using Equation (2). Each column reports regression results on the subgroup indicated on the 
column header. The dependent variable is the log of total income. The key independent variable is an 
interaction term of a bureaucrat dummy and retirement dummy. It is being instrumented by the 
interaction term of a bureaucrat dummy and the mandatory retirement dummy. Col (1) is estimated using 
sample containing only daughters; Col (2) is estimated using sample only containing sons. Col (3) is 
estimated using only sample containing only the sample includes offspring who have reported income 
and parents who are between 50 years old to 70 years old. Standard errors are in parentheses.  
TABLE 3.11 DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCE OTHER OUTCOMES   
 
Notes: All regressions are clustered at the individual level and include province-year fix effect. It is 
estimated using Equation (2). Each column reports regression results on outcome indicated on the 
column header. The dependent variable is the log of total income. The key independent variable is an 
interaction term of a bureaucrat dummy and retirement dummy. It is being instrumented by the 
interaction term of a bureaucrat dummy and the mandatory retirement dummy. In addition, it includes a 
bureaucrat parent dummy and retirement status dummy, with the latter being instrumented by mandatory 
retirement dummy. The sample includes offspring who have reported income and parents who are 
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Appendix Table 1.1 List of School Desegregation years (from Welch and Light, 1987) 
 
State Year County District Change Notes 
AK 1971 Pulaski Little Rock 0.52 
 AL 1970 Jefferson Birmingham 0.19 
 
AL 1970 Jefferson 
Jefferson 
County 0.19 
* Same County, so assigned to be 
the same date as Birmingham 
AL 1971 Mobile Mobile 0.3 
 AZ 1979 Pima Tucson 0.22 
 CA 1966 Alameda Oakland -0.03 
 CA 1969 Contra Costa Richmond 0.03 
 CA 1970 Los Angeles Los Angeles 0.42 
 
CA 1970 Los Angeles Long Beach 0.42 
*Assigned to be the same date as 
Pasadena 
CA 1970 Los Angeles Pasadena 0.42 




Coext San Francisco 0.09 
 CA 1976 Sacramento Sacramento 0.11 
 CA 1977 San Diego San Diego 0.26 
 
CA 1978 San Bernardino 
San 
Bernardino 0.34 
 CA 1978 Fresno Fresno 0.06 
 CA 1981 Santa Clara San Jose 0.14 
 CO 1974 Denver Coext Denver 0.38 
 CT 1966 Hartford Hartford 0.05 
 CT 1970 Fairfield Stamford 0.44 
 




FL 1969 Brevard 
Brevard 
County 0.15 
 FL 1969 Lee Lee County 0.52 
 
FL 1969 Pinellas 
Pinellas 
County 0.51 
 FL 1969 Polk Polk County 0.36 
 




FL 1970 Broward 
Broward 
County 0.42 
 FL 1970 Dade Dade County 0.15 
 







Coext Duval County 0.48 
 




FL 1972 Orange County 
Orange 
County 0.42 
 GA 1971 Muscogee Muscogee 0.54 
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County 
GA 1973 De Kalb Atlanta 0.15 *one school district, two counties 
GA 1973 Fulton Atlanta 0.15 *one school district, two counties 
GA 1980 Dougherty 
Dougherty 
County 0.64 
 IL 1973 Winnebago Rockford 0.33 
 IL 1982 Cook Chicago 0.12 
 IN 1971 Allen Fort Wayne 0.39 
 IN 1973 Marion Indianapolis 0.58 
 IN 1981 St Joseph South Bend 0.45 
 KS 1971 Sedgwick Wichita 0.51 
 KS 1977 Wyandotte Kansas City 0.36 
 













 LA 1969 Caddo Caddo Parish 0.48 
 
















Rouge Parish 0.59 
 
LA 1971 Jefferson 
Jefferson 
Parish 0.6 
 MA 1974 Hampden Springfield 0.16 
 MA 1974 Suffolk Boston 0.35 
 MA 1976 Bristol New Bedford 0.08 
 








 MD 1974 Baltimore Baltimore 0.14 
 MI 1968 Kent Grand Rapids 0.42 
 MI 1972 Ingham Lansing 0.28 
 MI 1975 Wayne Detroit 0.16 
 MN 1974 Hennepin Minneapolis 0.4 
 MO 1977 Clay Kansas City 0.28 *one school district, two counties 
MO 1977 Jackson Kansas City 0.28 *one school district, two counties 
MO 1980 
St Louis City 
Ind St. Louis 0.22 
 NB 1976 Douglas Omaha 0.44 
 
















NC 1970 Mecklenburg 
Mecklenburg 
County 0.81 
 NJ 1961 Essex Newark -0.05 
 NJ 1976 Hudson Jersey City 0.08 
 NV 1972 Clark Clark County 0.14 
 NY 1970 Monroe Rochester 0.16 
 NY 1980 Erie Buffalo 0.04 
 OH 1973 Hamilton Cincinnati 0.22 
 OH 1976 Montgomery Dayton 0.67 
 OH 1977 Summit Akron 0.19 
 OH 1979 Franklin Columbus 0.59 
 OH 1979 Cuyahoga Cleveland 0.67 
 OH 1980 Lucas Toledo 0.26 
 OK 1971 Tulsa Tulsa 0.2 
 
OK 1972 Oklahoma 
Oklahoma 
City 0.66 
 OK 1973 Comanche Lawton 0.14 




Coext Philadephia 0.07 
 PA 1980 Allegheny Pittsburgh 0.35 
 














Nashville Coext Nashville 0.52 
 TN 1973 Shelby Memphis 0.27 
 TX 1969 Bexar San Antonio 0.22 
 TX 1970 Houston Houston 0.24 
 TX 1971 Dallas Dallas 0.29 
 TX 1972 Potter Amarillo 0.17 *One School, Two County 
TX 1972 Randall Amarillo 0.17 *One School, Two County 
TX 1973 Tarrant Fort Worth 0.27 
 TX 1973 Mc Lennan Waco 0.5 
 TX 1978 El Paso El Paso 0.18 
 TX 1978 Lubbock Lubbock 0.25 
 TX 1980 Austin Austin 0.48 
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 WA 1968 Pierce Tacoma 0.28 




County Milwaukee 0.48 
 




Appendix Table 1.3 List of Counties that Did Not Report Mothers Years of Education 
Starting 1970 
 
Year/County AL AK CT DE GA MA PA TX VA WI 
1970 
          1971 
          1972 
   
x x 
     1973 
   
x x 
     1974 
   
x x 
     1975 
   
x x 
     1976 x 
  
x x x 
    1977 x 
  
x x x 
     
Appendix Table 1.4 List of Counties that Did Not Report Gestational Age Starting 
1970 
 
Year/County AL AK CT DE GA MA PA TX VA WI 
1970 
          1971 
          1972 
   
x x 
     1973 
   
x x 
     1974 
   
x x 
     1975 
   
x x 
     1976 x 
  
x x x 
    1977 x 
  
x x x 
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Appendix Table 1.8 Exposure to School Desegregation on Biracial Births by Year for 
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Appendix Table 1.9 White Mothers: Exposure to School Desegregation on Biracial 
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Appendix Table 1.10 Years of Exposure to School Desegregation on Biracial Births 




Appendix Table 1.11 Years of Exposure to School Desegregation on Biracial Births 
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Appendix Table 1.25 White Mothers: Years of Exposure to School Desegregation on 




Appendix Table 1.26 White Mothers: Years of Exposure to School Desegregation on 
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Appendix Table 3.8 Difference-in-Differences Household Same Probability Check    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
